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CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE WILL OF STEPHEN GIRARD
ELIAS CLARK-
A charitable trust serves two masters-the property owner who created it
and society which is its beneficiary. On the initial assumption that the interests
of each coincide, the law guarantees the trust enforcement, perpetual existence
and tax immunity. But aware that the harmony in any partnership is some-
times disrupted, it has also evolved methods of adjusting the two interests
when they diverge. The process has been criticized as hesitant in application
and over-solicitous to the demands of the settlor.1 Yet one has come to expect
few surprises by way of doctrinal innovations. Now, however, a challenge has
arisen from a wholly new and unexpected quarter. The attack is levelled
at the trust which makes race the criterion for benefit, and the challenge stems
from the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2
THE GIRARD CASE: AN INCOMPLETE SOLUTION
On April 29 of this year, the Supreme Court took the first step toward de-
segregation of charitable trusts.3 Without dissent, it held in a per curiam decision
tAssociate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Two basic devices are used to protect the public interest: first, before the trusf
becomes operative, a court may withhold the charitable designation and all the privileges
which accompany that characterization; and, second, if a valid over-all charitable purpose
is present, a court may remove particular provisions which are obsolete, impossible or
illegal by applying the doctrine of cy pres. These devices are administered in a manner
which makes the settlor's intent primary and the public interest subordinate. See text
at note S1 infra. For criticism of the inevitable abuses, see TAYLOR, PUBLIC AccouNTA-
IILITY OF FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS (1953). On the possibility of tax
advantages to the settlor and his family, see MACDONALD, THE FORD FOUNDATION 132-37
(1956) ; Eaton, Charitable Foundations and Related Matters Under the 1950 Revenue Act,
37 VA. L. REv. 1, 253 (1951) ; Latcham, Private Charitable Foundations: Some Tax and
Policy Implications, 98 U. PA. L. Rxv. 617 (1950) (written prior to the 1950 amendments
to the Internal Revenue Code) ; Comment, Colleges, Charities and the Revenue Act of 1950,
60 YALE L.J. 851 (1951). For discussion of the continuance of obsolete trusts, see FiscH.
THE CY PREs DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950); SIIES, PUBLIC POLICY AND
THE DEAD HAND, 110-40 (1955) ; Cooper, Charitable Community Trusts, 25 CONN. B.J.
17 (1951) ; Comment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres. 49 YALE L.J. 303 (1939). On the prob-
lems of uncontrolled wealth and power, see Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government
by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 155 (1957).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 77 Sup. Ct. 806 (1957).
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that the Board of Directors of City Trustees in Philadelphia, while exercising
its obligation as trustee to deny Negroes admission to the college created under
the will of Stephen Girard, was engaged in state action proscribed by the Four-
teenth Amendment.4 On its face the decision does not pose a threat to charitable
trusts generally; for it applies only to the unusual trust which by its terms
requires both discrimination and a governmental trustee. But the pattern of
race problems in the past demonstrates that, once the door has been pushed
ajar, attempts will be made to widen the opening. And the Girard case may
yet provide the impetus. The Supreme Court remanded "for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with this opinion." As if anticipating this development,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had indicated that if the identity of the
trustee required a finding of state action, the proper remedy would be substi-
tution of a private trustee, not excision of the limitation to whites.5 Should
this remedy be effected, the United States Supreme Court will be confronted
with a difficult choice if it again reviews the case. It must then either ap-
prove the discrimination so returned to a private form, thereby bolstering the
determination of the Southern states to preserve school segregation, or it must
hold all charitable trusts subject to the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even before the Supreme Court took action, the Girard case had attracted
widespread attention.6 At first glance, this interest is difficult to understand.
In the complex of Negro-white relations, the maliciously discriminatory trust
is only of peripheral importance. To the relatively few now in existence,
the addition of many more is unlikely.7 Established institutions cannot afford,
4. The decision has attracted attention notonlybecauseof its implications but also because
of the manner in which it was rendered. Seemingly equating Girard with the more routine
segregation cases, the Court passed judgment on the petition for certiorari without hearing
oral argument. See note 38 infra. The brevity of the decision also indicates that the Justices
considered the case of routine significance. It has been suggested that a fuller airing of the
matter was in order. New Republic, June 3, 1957, p. 7.
5. Girard W\ill Case, 386 Pa. 548, 566, 127 A.2d 287, 295 (1956) ; see text at note 49
infra.
6. See Gordon, The Girard College Case: Desegregation and a Municipal Trust, 304
ANNALS 53 (1956) (discussion of the use of sociological testimony) ; Miller, Racial Dis-
crimination and Private Schools, 41 MINN. L. REv. 145, 245, 266-76 (1957) ; Shanks, "State
Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 213 (1956) ; Notes, 56 COLutI.
L. REv. 285 (1956), 104 U. PA. L. REv. 547 (1956), 3 WAYNE L. REv. 143 (1957).
7. No compilation of such trusts has been found. The digests list the few which have
been litigated on any ground. A sampling includes: Averill v. Lewis, 106 Conn. 582, 138
Atl. 815 (1927) (trust for maintenance of free rest for white, Protestant, female teachers) ;
Beardsley v. Selectmen, 53 Conn. 489, 3 Atl. 557 (1885) (bequest for worthy, deserving,
poor, white, An-erican, Protestant, Democratic widows and orphans residing in Bridge-
port) ; Woodstown Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Snelbaker, 136 N.J. Eq. 62, 40 A.2d 222
(Ch. 1944) ; Humphrey v. Board of Trustees, 203 N.C. 201, 165 S.E. 547 (1932) (income
of trust to be used for education of white girl orphan selected from specified orphanage
each year by Board of Trustees) ; Hass v. Hass, 195 N.C. 734, 143 S.E. 541 (1928)
(trust for benefit of indigent, blind, caucasian children) ; Columbia v. Monteith, 139 S.C.
262, 137 S.E. 727 (1926) (trust to establish industrial school for children of indigent
white persons).
The Girard disposition has apparently served as a prototype for other trusts. Two
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from a public relations standpoint, to accept money with this taint upon it.,
Moreover, it was apparent from the outset that the two Negro boys who had
suffered the discrimination in Girard would never personally benefit from the
action. By the time the litigation is ended, their age will probably foreclose
any opportunity to enroll in the schoolY Fascination in the case stems not so
much from the immediate solution as from what that solution portends for
the future. And because the present Supreme Court pronouncement is only a
prelude to the broader consideration of charitable trusts, the interest remains
undiminished.
First, the case highlights the uncertain definition of state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment created by past decisions. In Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, the Court, speaking the conscience of a majority of the nation, took a
giant step in the evolution of full equality for the Negro.10 But the force of
this bold thrust may be lost in the welter of confusion attending its implemen-
tation. Today Southern states are reconstituting their schools in a form super-
ficially private." Their efforts would be valueless, even as a basis for argument,
if the Court's occasional ambiguity concerning the state-private dichotomy
did not give the various schemes a semblance of legality.
citizens of Philadelphia, Robert N. Carson who died in 1907 and Charles E. Ellis who
died in 1909, established by their respective wills separate institutions under the trusteeship
of corporate fiduciaries setting out the qualifications for admission in language very similar
to that of the Girard will except that the limitations were to girls instead of boys. Both
wills were litigated, but not on the ground of racial restrictions. See Carson's Estate, 244 Pa.
401, 90 Atl. 719 (1914) ; Ellis's Estate, 12 Pa. D. & C. 213 (1929). These trusts, along
with the Girard trust, are discussed in CLAGUE, CHARITABLE TRUSTS 81-97 (1935). Not
every trust spawned by the Girard will has been racially restricted. See McKee Estate,
378 Pa. 607, 108 A.2d 214 (1954) (trust to establish school for "poor colored male orphan
children and poor white male orphan children," the number to be kept as nearly equal as
possible).
8. The most sensational example of bigoted giving was the offer of George W. Arm-
strong to establish a $50,000,000 endowment for Jefferson Military College of Natchez,
,Mississippi. The gift was conditional upon the exclusion of Jews and Negroes and the
teaching of the "true principles of Jeffersonian Democracy and the Constitution, Christianity
and the superiority of Anglo-Saxon and Latin-American races." Although the school was
alleged to be operating at a deficit, the trustees refused the offer. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13,
1949, p. 64, col. 1. Armstrong then avowed to carry out his program through the Judge
Armstrong Foundation, but his trust tax exemption was revoked. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13,
1949, p. 28, col. 6.
9. The will stipulates that the boys must be between the ages of six and ten to be
eligible for admission. At the date of the decision one boy was already over the maximum
age, and the other close to it. See Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, April 30, 1957, p. 3, col. 4.
10. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. The statutes are collected in 1 RACE RE. L. REP. 422 (Miss.) ; 728, 927-28 (La.);
730 (S.C.) ; 924 (Fla.) ; 930-40 (N.C.) ; 1091-1112 (Va.) ; 2 id. at 215-22, 455 (Tenn.);
453 (Ark.); 453-55 (Ga.). The purpose is to stall and confuse implementation of the
decision by endless litigation. The statutes are, of course, of dubious constitutionality, but
absent action by the President or Congress, they may well produce serious delay. Leflar
& Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HARV. L. REv. 377 (1954) ; Nicholson,
The Legal Standing of the South's School Resistance Proposals, 7 S.C.L.Q. 1 (1954).
1957]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
State action cases involving such basic rights of citizenship as voting and
housing have followed a pattern of development.' 2 A discriminatory statute
is first invalidated, only to be replaced by the same discrimination ostensibly
in private form. The Court has resolutely held to substance, prohibiting the
discrimination regardless of the agency producing it. As a result, the language
in the end decision of each sequence provides a definition of state action suffici-
ently broad to cover almost any type of human activity.' 3 Nevertheless, a
handful of state decisions, which, despite proof of the same elements of govern-
mental participation, have found no state action, and which the Court has
refused, on one ground or another, to set aside, prevents the definition from
assuming all inclusive proportions.' 4 Except in the primary areas of govern-
12. Many of the cases are collected in EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES, 993-1172 (1952) ; State Action: A Study of Requirements Under
the Fourteenth Amend-nent, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 613 (1956).
13. The sequence in the area of voting in primaries moves from Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927) (Texas statute making Negroes ineligible to vote in Democratic
primary a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment) ; through Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S.
73 (1932) (determination of qualifications for voting by state executive committee of the
Democratic Party under permission of statute also unconstitutional) ; Grovey v. Townsend,
295 U.S. 45 (1935) (qualifications set by the party in convention under permission of statute
constitutional) ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (Grovey v. Townsend overruled):
Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (D.S.C. 1947), aff'd, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948) (Democratic Party's continued exclusion of Negroes after
all statutes on primaries repealed unconstitutional) ; to Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953) (exclusion of Negroes from club which held pre-primary elections to determine
candidates for state primaries held prohibited state action). For a discussion of the white
primary cases, see HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAw 335-49 (1952) ; Note, 47 COLum. L.
REV. 76 (1947). The sequence in the area of occupancy of real property has a less compre-
hensive history starting with Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (city ordinance for-
bidding Negroes to occupy houses in white neighborhoods unconstitutional) ; and ending
with Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (private restrictive covenants cannot be
enforced by injunction) ; and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (nor by damages).
14. The more prominent examples include Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299
N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950) (the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company could constitutionally exercise the privilege as landlord to refuse
to lease to Negroes although it had constructed the 25,000-person housing development
with the help of New York City through tax exemptions and powers of condemnation);
Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Ia. 147, 60 N.W"r.2d 110 (1953)
(upholding restriction in contract for purchase of burial lot to members of caucasian race),
aff'd per curiam, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), judgement of afrnzance vacated, cert. dismissed,
349 U.S. 70 (1955) (original grant improvident because enactment by Iowa legislature
of statute which forbids such clauses in the future made question moot); Charlotte
Park and Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956) (gift to city of land on condition that premises not to be
used by Negroes created possibility of reverter which could operate without state action) ;
Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955) (Virginia miscegenation statute up-
held as legitimate objective of state government), 350 U.S. 891 (1956) (matter returned
for clarificaton of conflicts of law point), 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956) (state
court refused invitation to clarify), 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (case dismissed for want of a
properly presented federal question). The Girard case indicates the difficulties in drawing
conclusions from previous refusals to review. Involving the sensitive and highly per-
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mental service, no one can predict the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Must Shelley v. Kraemer, for example, be confined to the area of restrictive
covenants, or is it to stand for the broader proposition that any form of judicial
action in aid of private discrimination is prohibited state action ?15
The Girard case has the necessary ingredients to supply some of the answers.
It already stands as additional proof that the Court will not tolerate any form
of assistance by a state agency in a discriminatory scheme. And, should further
developments put all charitable trusts in issue, the inextricable combination of
the elements of private and public action inherent in such trusts will force the
court to consider the over-all scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the possibility of a challenge to long-established principles of charitable
trusts lies a second point of interest. It has been suggested that application
of the Fourteenth Amendment through a finding of state action would make
a shambles of the law of charitable trusts.16 If a property owner cannot make
race the basis of selection, what of the religious trust; the private school and uni-
versity; and ironically, the trust for the exclusive benefit of the Negro ?17 The
argument, so cynically made in other areas of race conflict, that segregation
benefits both races, has a ring of truth in this context. Although no statistical
proof is available, it might fairly be assumed that there are more trusts favoring
Negroes-their depressed position has traditionally been of major concern--
than of a converse type. Parenthetically, scholarship funds limited to Negroes
sonal area of testamentary power, it seemed, in light of the above cases, to be a fit
subject for refusal. For view that a denial of certiorari makes law and national policy,
see Harper & Rosenthal, W hat the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Tern-An
Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 293 (1950).
15. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). For the implications of this case, see HALE,
FREEDOm THROUGH LAW 366-82 (1952) ; Note, The Distintegration of a Concept-State
Action Under the 14th and 15th Amendments, 96 U. PA. L. Rm. 402 (1948).
16. See notes 86, 92 infra.
17. As indicated in note 7 supra, many trusts with discriminatory restrictions are
dedicated to quaint purposes popular in the philanthropy of earlier years. They are of
slight social importance. If the Fourteenth Amendment is extended into the area of
charitable trusts, its greatest effect will undoubtedly be in the field of private education.
The funds (other than tuition fees) by which such institutions are supported may take
a variety of forms including outright gifts, income from trusts or endowments, and special
purpose funds. Orthodox doctrine, however, treats them all, for most purposes, as trusts.
Thus the enforcement procedures described herein are available to police the use of such
funds by charitable corporations, and a state's attorney general is recognized as the
proper party to initiate any necessary actions. 4 Scorr, TRUSTS § 348.1 (2d ed. 1956);
Taylor, A New Chapter in the New York Law of Charitable Corporations, 25 CORNELL L.Q.
382, 396-400 (1940) ; Blackwell, The Charitable Corporation and tire Charitable Trust, 24
WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 31 n.102 (1938).
A few private schools have already engaged in a measure of voluntary desegregation.
For an invaluable study in this area, see Miller, Racial Discrimination and Private Schools,
41 MINN. L. REv. 145, 175 (1956). The United Negro College Fund with an annual
fund-raising goal in the neighborhood of two million dollars announced that all thirty-one
Negro colleges (all but one in the South) which it helps to support were open to white
students following the Court's desegregation decision. N.Y. Times, April 2, 1956, p. 22,
col. 3.
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and administered by state universities now appear highly suspect under the
Court's ruling.
ANOTHER LOOK AT THE GIRARD TRUST
Girard College is a boarding school for orphan boys of pre-college age. Named
after its benefactor, Stephen Girard, one of Philadelphia's most distinguished
early citizens, the school has served the community well in its one hundred
and nine years of existence.' 8 Its annual enrollment exceeds 1,000; it has had
its share of eminent graduates; and its endowment, currently quoted at ninety-
eight million dollars, ranks it among the select few of privately endowed
educational institutions in the country. 19 In one important respect, however,
Girard College is out of step with its place and times. It discriminates against
Negroes. The persons charged with the management of the college do not
defend this discrimination as a matter of educational policy.20 They discriminate
only because a will written over a century and a quarter ago requires them to
do so.21
Stephen Girard deserves better than to be discredited by a provision which
was seemingly only incidental to his overall design.22 His career marks him as
a creative, generous and, by the standards of his time, tolerant man. An immi-
grant who became a millionaire, Girard was the personification of the American
dream. After settling in Philadelphia in 1777, he proceeded by a variety of
enterprises, primarily trade and banking, to accumulate a sizeable fortune.
Throughout his long life, he was always ready to participate in community
affairs, exhibiting in his contributions to the city and its citizens the philan-
thropic ingenuity apparently characteristic of the city of Franklin in the early
18. See Girard Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 671, 693-94 (1955).
19. Girard College has been ranked fifth in total endowment behind Harvard, Yale,
Columbia and the University of Texas. The college receives no tuition or fees and is
therefore entirely dependent upon the income from the trust. Gordon, The Girard College
Case: Desegregation and a Minicipal Trust, 304 ANNALS 53 (1956).
20. At the Orphans' Court hearing, expert testimony was offered on the evils of
segregated education. While the Board of Trustees did not argue that segregation was a
virtue, it vigorously opposed the experts' arguments with evidence of the contributions
which the college had made over the years. For description of the testimony, see id. at
57-61. See also Girard Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 671, 674-75, 692-94 (1955).
21. Sections of the will relevant to the college are set out in Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs,
43 U.S. (2 How.) 117, 119-28 (1844). See also WoLcoTT, BACKGROUND OF THE EDUCA-
TIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE WILL OF STEPHEN GIRARD (1948). In the thirty-five page
document the limitation to white boys appears only twice. See Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs,
supra at 128, 130. However, a similar restriction is imposed on gifts to other charities.
THE WILL OF THE LATE STEPHEN GIRARD, EsQ. arts. V, VIII (1831).
22. There are two biographies of Girard: .1CMASTER, THE LIFE AND TImES or
STEPHEN GIRRD (1918), and WiLDES, LONELY MIDAS (1943). A history of the college and
of the current litigation is detailed in the opinions of the Pennsylvania courts. Girard
Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 671 (1955) (opinion by hearing judge of Orphans' Court of
Philadelphia County), id. at 708 (1956) (opinion for full Orphans' Court) ; Girard Will




days. His will, a thirty-five page docunent prepared when he was eighty, repre-
sents the ultimate expression of his gratitude to his foster home. He had no
children; accordingly, his gifts to individuals took only a relatively small
portion of his estate. The rest went to a variety of charities including such
community enterprises as the police department, hospitals, highway construc-
tion and improvement of internal waterways. These gifts, however, lacked
the personal touch. In his residuary estate, on the other hand, he established
a school, describing in meticulous detail nearly every aspect of its existence-
architecture, qualifications of student and faculty, curriculum and general oper-
ation. For the construction and maintenance of the institution, which has
endured as a monument to a man of wisdom and vision 2 3 Girard left two million
dollars to "The Mayor, Aldermen and citizens of Philadelphia," the city's
official name at that time. He instructed the city to admit only "poor, male
white orphan children" between the ages of six and ten.
At Girard's death the General Assembly, taking immediate steps to implement
the will, passed two acts permitting the city to carry out Girard's instructions
and authorizing the Common Council to elect or appoint officers and agents
for that purpose.2 4 Managment was thus vested in the city proper until 1869
when the General Assembly established the special agency by which it is gov-
erned to this day.2 5 The Girard trust, together with all other trusts under
the trusteeship of the city, uwas transferred to a Board of Directors of City
Trustees, composed of the Mayor, the Presidents of the Select and Common
Councils and twelve other citizens of Philadelphia appointed by the judges of
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Although the statute
was apparently designed to establish a more definite line of demarcation between
the municipal and trust functions of the city, the members of the Board were
specifically made "officers and agents" of the city.
2 6
The school did not actually go into operation until some sixteen years after
Girard's death. Construction was slowed by a depression severe enough, so
the story goes, to cause the hard-pressed city officials to appropriate some half
23. In 1950 on the occasion of the two hundredth anniversary of the birth of Stephen
Girard, the Newcomen Society of North America gave him a posthumous award for his
contributions to Philadelphia. John A. Diemand, the principal speaker, concluded his
remarks with the following tribute to Girard's vision:
"No one who reads the Will can fail to be impressed by the breadth of its plans for
the future, the wealth of its detail, and the precision of its terms. It focuses and
projects beyond his grave the spirit of a truly great man ! As the lawyer-descendant
of the man who drafted the document said at the recent Girard College Centennial,
this Will shows Mr. Girard to have been 'a man of tolerance, unselfishness, gener-
osity, a thinker well ahead of his contemporaries, and a pathfinder in educationai
philanthropy."'
DIEMAND, STEPHEN GIRARD (1750-1831)-A PROPosAL FOR POSTHUMOUS AWARD 16.
24. PENNSYLVANIA LAws-1831-32, No. 93, at 176; id. No. 115, at 275.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 6481-86 (Purdon Supp. 1956).
26. "The said directors, in the discharge of their duties, and within the scope of their
powers aforesaid, shall be considered agents or officers of said city... ." Id. § 6486.
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million of the Girard funds to general municipal purposes. 27 A more direct
threat to completion came from the first of several attacks brought by a particu-
larly recalcitrant group of disappointed heirs. The Supreme Court, twenty-
five years before, had held that equity's jurisdiction over charitable trusts was
not inherent but founded on the Statute of Elizabeth.28 Arguing that Pennsyl-
vania had not retained the Statute as part of the common law, the heirs sought
to have the trust invalidated on the ground that no authority existed for en-
forcement of charitable trusts. Secondly, they claimed that a city was not
authorized to act as a trustee. And finally, they contended that the gift was not
in any event charitable, because the will directed that no minister should be
admitted to the premises lest the students become confused by sectarian bicker-
ing.20 In an opinion still respected as the cornerstone of the American law
of charitable trusts, Mr. Justice Story found the earlier decision based on a
mistaken historical notion and held that, absent the Statute of Elizabeth, equity
could recognize a charitable trust.30 Furthermore the city, authorized by the
state legislature, was held a proper trustee and the trust charitable. Neither
this nor any subsequent decision mentioned the discrimination against
Negroes.
From a modern perspective, the case stands as a dramatic example of the
transitory nature of community attitudes. The decision upholding the once
hotly-debated clause excluding ministers from the school grounds has now
been hailed as one of the first pronouncements of the American policy on non-
sectarian schools. 31 But by 1954, when two Negro boys applied for admission
27. See Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 631, 127 A2d 287, 326 (1956) (dissenting
opinion). The point is of little significance except to indicate that the city did not always
honor the difference between trust and municipal funds as scrupulously as it does today. See
note 38 infra.
28. Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 1 (1819).
29. Article XXI, para. 9, of the will, reprinted in Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S.
(2 How.) 117, 123 (1844), reads in part:
"Secondly, I enjoin and require that no ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any
sect whatsoever, shall ever hold or exercise any station or duty whatever in the
said college; nor shall any such person ever be admitted for any purpose, or as a
visitor, within the premises appropriated to the purposes. of the said college.
"In making this restriction, I do not mean to cast any reflection upon any sect
or person whatsoever; but, as there is such a multitude of sects, and such a diversity
of opinion amongst them, I desire to keep the tender minds of the orphans, who
are to derive advantage from this bequest, free from the excitement which clashing
doctrines and sectarian controversy are so apt to produce; my desire is, that all
the instructors and teachers in the college shall take pains to instil into the minds
of the scholars the purest principles of morality, so that, on their entrance into active
life, they may, from inclination and habit, evidence benevolence towards their fellow-
creatures, and a love of truth, sobriety, and industry, adopting at the same time such
religious tenets as their matured reason may enable them to prefer."
30. Vidal v. Girard's Exrs, supra note 29.




to Girard College, the Supreme Court had overruled the separate but equal
doctrine, thus proclaiming full equality as the legal and moral position of the
country.32 Pennsylvania had enacted a series of anti-discrimination statutes ;3
the city of Philadelphia had followed a similar course ;3 and the Negro neigh-
borhood was fast encroaching on the Girard campus. The Negro boys, although
qualified in all respects save race, were denied admission. In the words of
the City Board of Trustees, it had been "advised by its solicitor that it had no
power to admit other than white boys to Girard College."3 5
In September of 1954 the two boys brought an action in the Orphans' Court
of Philadelphia County to compel the Board to show cause why they should
not be admitted. The city, through the Mayor and the Commission on Human
Relations, and ultimately the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, filed separate
petitions on the side of the rejected applicants. 3 They argued that the Board
was an arm of the city and that the limitation to white children was therefore
illegal and should be removed by application of cy pres. The Board attempted
to disassociate itself from the city and thus avoid the label of state action on
two grounds: first, that as a matter of fact the Board operated as an independent
agency rather than as an arm of the municipal government; and second, that
the city, though admittedly retaining its identity in a governmental or pro-
prietary capacity, was not a city in legal contemplation when it acted as trustee.3 7
32. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1310 (Purdon Supp. 1956) (elimination of discrimi-
nation in public schools) ; id. tit. 18, § 4654 (prohibition of discrimination and discriminatory
advertising by privately operated public places such as restaurants, movies, theaters and
swimming pools) ; id. tit. 43, § 153 (contractors working on public contracts not to dis-
criminate) ; id. tit. 35, § 1711 (prohibition of discrimination by private housing developers
contracting with an urban redevelopment authority) ; id. tit. 43, §§ 951-63 (Fair Employment
Practices Act) ; id. tit. 35, § 1590.12 (no discrimination in veterans' housing) ; id. tit. 53,
§§ 46187, 53273 (Purdon 1957), id. tit. 61, § 331.13 (no discrimination in public employment).
34. Philadelphia Ordinances 74-80 (1948). These ordinances established a Fair Em-
ployment Practices Commission to insure equality in employment practices in the city.
Two years later the Commission was expanded into the Commission on Human Re-
lations to perform the functions of the previous Commission and to promote better "under-
standing among persons and groups of different races, colors, religious and national
origins" through educational programs. Brief for Appellants, p. 43, Girard Will Case,
386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956). On July 23, 1953, the City Council urged "the Board
of Directors of City Trusts to issue an order to the President and Administrative Staff
of Girard College to cease and desist from its policy of discrimination against Negro
applicants for admission to Girard College." Resolution No. 433, at 3.
35. Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 623, 127 A.2d 287, 322 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
This letter, in view of the later argument of the Board, contained a touch of irony-it
carried the official letterhead of the City of Philadelphia. Id. at 625, 127 A.2d at 323.
36. Judge Bolger, the hearing judge in the Orphans' Court, requested that the Attorney
General enter the case "to fulfill his duty of enforcing the trust ...and representing
the Commonwealth's possible interest in remainder." Apparently the Attorney General
initially filed in defense of the Board and the will. This answer was subsequently with-
drawn and, on July 7, 1955, he filed a separate petition joining the other petitioners. Girard
Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 671, 674. See N.Y. Times, April 12, 1955, p. 18, col. 5.
37. The majority and concurring opinions in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court consist-
ently stated that a governmental unit might discriminate when it did so in a fiduciary capacity.
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The factual argument was never strong.3 8 Girard had named the city as trustee.
And the act of 1869 did not purport to oust the city of its authority; it merely
specified the agency by which.that authority was to be exercised.
But the legal argument persuaded a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. The city, in the court's view, had no discretion under the specific direc-
tions in the will. Thus it was acting as Girard's agent, the discrimination was
Girard's, and Girard was a private citizen outside the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment.39 In reversing, the Supreme Court decided the issue in three
See Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 561, 586-87, 127 A.2d 287, 293, 305 (1956). See also
St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830, 832 n.3 (5th Cir. 1956). The word "fiduciary"
without some qualification would appear too broad. A city trustee might discriminate
even though the will did not impose any racial limitations. Under such circumstances the
discrimination would, even under the rule of the Pennsylvania courts, constitute prohibited
state action. The element necessary to the analysis was the specific command of the
will. The closest analogy to a city functioning as a trustee is in its activities as a proprietor
of recreational facilities. In recent years the proprietary argument has been Uniformly
rejected. St. Petersburg v. Alsup, supra; Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004, 1008
(S.D. W.Va. 1948).
38. The following factors lend support to the Board's argument: the non-political
method of appointment; Board members receive no salary; the funds are carefully segre-
gated from the general funds of the city; the intent of the 1869 statute to distinguish
more precisely the trust functions from other municipal functions; and the specific omission
of the Board from the provisions of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, § A-100 (1951).
Contrary evidence includes the following factors: the Board is composed of twelve persons
appointed by the elected judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
plus the Mayor and the President of the City Council; the City Treasurer acts as treasurer
and his office was responsible for the growth of the fund from two million to ninety-eight
million dollars; the City Controller audits the accounts; the legislature exercises over-all
supervision through visitations; and the Board has regularly held itself out as an agency
of the city on its briefs, letterheads and the like. In sum it would appear that the city
does not exercise as, much control over the Girard property as it does over other municipal
property, but that Girard College would never have achieved its present position without
the active participation and assistance of the city. The legality of the 1869 severance was
subject to an unsuccessful challenge by the city. Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169 (1870).
For differing interpretations of this decision, see Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 595,
629, 127 A.2d 287, 309, 325 (1956) (concurring and dissenting opinions).
39. Suggestions that a trustee is the settlor's agent are out of line with traditional
understanding of the trustee's obligations to the public. A trustee does not lose his
personal identity by assuming his fiduciary office. He is neither an agent of the settlor
nor of the trust estate. Thus his torts and contracts are his own, and his liability mu,t
be met initially out of his own pocket. That he is acting pursuant to the trust terms
or that the settlor attempted to excuse his conduct in advance is no defense against an
innocent outsider, even though both are arguments to be made in his action for reimburse-
ment out of the trust estate. Although the rule of personal liability originated in the
refusal of the law courts to admit a trust's existence, its modern continuance has been
justified as the fairest procedure for allocating responsibility. The law recognizes that
no trust is self-executing. It exists only through the acts of living persons who must
assume responsibility for those acts. A few statutory alterations of the rule have been
made, but they are designed, for the most part, to augment the claimant's remedies and not
to relieve the trustee of liability. Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal. 2d 54, 181 P.2d 645 (1947) ;
Kirchner v. Muller, 280 N.Y. 23, 19 N.E.2d 665 (1939) ; In the Matter of Lathers' Will, 137
Misc. 226, 243 N.Y. Supp. 366 (Surr. Ct. 1930) ; Miller v. Jacobs, 361 Pa. 492, 65 A.2d 362
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sentences: "The Board which operates Girard College is an agency of the
State of Pennsylvania. Therefore, even though the Board was acting as a
trustee, its refusal to admit Foust and Felder to the college because they were
Negroes was discrimination by the State. Such discrimination is forbidden by
the Fourteenth Amendment."
40
This summary reversal may be further explained by the practical irration-
ality of the result reached by the Pennsylvania court. Throughout the South
today, the people are, by orderly referendum, vesting their government on
the state and local level with authority to continue segregation.4 1  Absent
questions of legality, the obligation of the officials to comply can hardly be
disputed. Their relationship to the electorate is essentially fiduciary. How-
ever, no one would assume that these schemes avoid the state action inter-
diction. Authority derived from many is thus to be denied while authority
derived from one-and one who has been dead a century and a quarter at that
-was inviolable under the Pennsylvania court's theory.
Although the effect of the decision was to propound this new, inverted theory
of democracy, eleven of the twelve judges who passed on the matter believed
that trust law demanded it. The crux of the majority argument was the assump-
tion that the city had no choice but to discriminate. This assumption is vulner-
(1949) ; Slakoff v. Foulke, 323 Pa. 352, 186 Atl. 79 (1936). For a model statute allowing
direct rights against the trust estate, see UNIFORm TRUSTS ACT §§ 12-14 (adopted by
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma and South Dakota). See,
generally, 3 ScOTT, TRUSTS c. 8 (2d ed. 1956); 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTmS c. 33
(1935) ; Stone, A Theory of Liability of Trust Estates for the Contracts and Torts of the
Trustee, 22 COLUm. L. REv. 527 (1922). The rule of personal liability for the contracts of
charitable trustees remains substantially unchanged. 4 ScOTT, TRUSTS § 403 (2d ed. 1956).
The authority on tort liability, however, is divided. The problem in the typical case does
not involve the personal liability of the trustee, but rather the extent to which there is
liability at all. See note 97 infra.
40. 77 Sup. Ct. 806, 807 (1957). Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
was the only citation given by the Court. Appellants sought review by the Supreme
Court by invoking the direct appeal jurisdiction of the Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2)
(1952) on the ground that the constitutionality of a statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§
6365-70 (Purdon Supp. 1956) (creating the Board of Directors of City Trusts), was
drawn into question by a construction which permitted racial discrimination and by
requesting certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 2157(3) on the ground that the equal protection
clause had been violated. The Court denied the appeal and rendered judgment on the
request for certiorari. 77 Sup. Ct. at 806. However, the appellant's argument attacking
the 1869 statute may have led the Court to describe the Board as "an agency of the State
of Pennsylvania" rather than an arm of the municipal government. The Court has subse-
quently denied the Board's petition for a rehearing. 25 U.S.L. VEEK 3359 (U.S. June
4, 1957).
41. E.g., a School Placement Law was adopted by the voters of Arkansas at a general
election on November 6, 1956. Incomplete and unofficial returns showed that, out of
nearly 400,000 votes cast, the plan was favored almost three to one. 1 RACE REL. L. REP.
1077 (1956). In 1954 the Louisiana voters amended the state constitution to permit con-
tinuation of segregation as an exercise of the police power. LA. CoNsT. art. 12, § 1.
See Murphy, DesegregationI in Public Education-A Generation of Future Litigation, 15
MD. L. REv. 221, 232-41 (1955).
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able both in fact and law. Compulsion presumes an enforcement procedure in
the event of noncompliance. But who was to object, had the city decided to
admit the two Negro boys? The city would not have been subject to the usual
opprobrium reserved for the faithless trustee. Its moral obligation to the two
million citizens of Philadelphia, eighteen per cent of whom are Negro, was
scarcely less than that to one dead testator. By orthodox principles, the duty
of enforcement belonged to the state's Attorney General. As his later action in
siding with the petitioners was to indicate, he was an unlikely candidate for
the job. Moreover, any other action by him might well have raised substantial
questions as to his own obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment.
42
Compulsion also assumes the immutability of the testator's words. But it
has never been thought that a settlor can compel his trustee to act illegally,
immorally or against the public interest.43 Courts have frequently held that
privileges which are allowed to the living cannot be projected beyond death
to the detriment of society.44 It can be argued, -however, that this authority,
while useful, does not exactly fit the present facts. The restrictions involved
in the cases are for the most part administrative rather than dispositive. and
they apply to trustees generally; while in Girard illegality attached only because
of the specific identity of the trustee.
45
Nevertheless, Shelley v. Kraemner appears to control the Board's argument
42. See text at notes 98-114 infra.
43. 1 ScorT, TRUSTS §§ 60-62 (2d ed. 1956) ; 2 id. § 166. While the authorities cito,
therein are hardly conclusive on the issues presented by the Girard case, they do recognize
that a trustee cannot be compelled to do an illegal act and that he cannot enforce against
the beneficiaries conditions which restrain marriage or interfere with religious liberties
and therefore violate public policy. In the Matter of iUberman, 279 N.Y. 458, 18 N.E.
2d 658 (1939); Devlin's Trust Estate, 284 Pa. 11, 130 AtI. 238 (1925). But see
Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228 (1955).
44. A testator devised in trust real property located in the heart of downtown
Waterbury, Connecticut, specifically forbidding leases for more than one year or the
erection of new buildings exceeding three stories in height. The usual arguments of
unexpected change in conditions were not available inasmuch as the testator fully under-
stood the conditions but imposed the restrictions anyway. Undaunted, the court taking
note of the deleterious effects of these restrictions on the normal development of the
surrounding neighborhood, held the restrictions illegal as against the community interest.
Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 135 At. 555 (1926). Had the testator lived
he could have imposed these limitations with impunity. In like manner, a living person
may refuse to alienate his property, accumulate income and use his property as leverage
to affect another person's religious or marital choice. When he attempts to continue
these results after death, the law frequently blocks his way. The court's power over a
charitable trust is even more firmly established. It may hold the testator's scheme to
a standard of public policy both at the time of creation and, under the doctrine of cy pres,
throughout its life. See text at notes 60-86 infra.
45. More directly analogous are the few cases in which the right of a governmental
trustee to administer a religious trust is challenged under the separation of church and
state doctrine. However, because of differences in the constitutional prohibitions involved,
the parallel is not exact. The Kentucky Supreme Court once found such a trust in
violation of the intent of "all our constitutions . . . to entirely separate church and state."
Maysville v. Wood, 102 Ky. 263, 43 S.W. 403 (1897) ; see also Bullard v. Shirley, 153
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that its action was private.46 In Shelley, the discrimination was to be achieved
by restrictive covenants in private deeds. The obligation of the state courts
before which these contracts came for enforcement closely parallels the obliga-
tion of the city as trustee. For the covenants were legally made and could have
been lawfully performed by private citizens.4 And when the applicable pre-
requisites are fulfilled, courts are obliged, notvithstanding the unworthiness of
the parties' motives, to decree performance. Thus, in enforcing the covenants,
the courts performed a function which the law apparently required of them.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that, though voluntary performance would
have been lawful, the state courts could not compel observance of the restric-
tions. In the course of the opinion Chief Justice Vinson seemingly put to rest
any argument based on the private source of the discrimination. "Nor is the
Amendment ineffective simply because the particular pattern of discrimination,
which the state has enforced, was defined initially by the terms of a private
agreement- State action, as -that phrase is understood for the purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all its forms.
'48
Mass. 559, 27 N.E. 766 (1891). Contra Attorney Gen. v. Dublin, 38 N.H. 459 (1859).
See, generally, 10 McQUILLn'N, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 28.31 (1950).
In Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), the Supreme Court used language
which seems to support the view that a governmental agency is not subject to constitu-
tional prohibitions when it functions as a trustee. The decision, however, was on other
grounds. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs had made a contract with the Bureau
of Catholic Indian Missions whereby Indian parents might send their children to the
Bureau's mission schools and the Commissioner would pay the tuition out of the tribal
treaty and trust funds which he administered. One member of the tribe challenged the
contract as violating a statute providing that "no appropriation whatever" be used to
support education in a sectarian school, and also as contrary to the spirit, if not the letter,
of the Constitution prohibiting the government from acting in a "sectarian capacity."
The Court had no difficulty with the statute. Despite the federal government's technical
title, the funds belonged to the Indians and were not, therefore, "appropriated monies"
in any sense. The First Amendment supported, rather than invalidated, the contract,
for the Indians could not be denied the right extended by the contract without depriving
them of freedom of religious choice and expression. On both counts the analogy to the
Girard situation breaks down. See, generally, Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Yelf-
trality, 20 U. Cm. L. R.y. 426, 429 (1953).
46. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
47. "We conclude, therefore, that the restrictive agreements standing alone cannot
be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to petitionrs by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. So long as the purposes of those argreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence
to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action by the State and the
provisions of the Amendment have not been violated." Id. at 13.
48. Id. at 20. Slelley v. Kraemer and its companion case, Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249 (1953), are not the only cases in which state assistance to private discrimination
has been held prohibited state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. For analo-
gies to the application of the "state action" label to the city's administration of the Girard
Trust, see Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 721 (1945) (self-perpetuating library board, originally appointed by private donor,
financially dependent on city) ; Parker v. University, 31 Del. CIL 381, 75 A.2d 225 (1950)
(university, originally private, taken over by state and designated a state university);
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As the case returns home, the next move belongs to the Orphans' Court.
Directed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to conduct proceedings not in-
consistent with the federal decision, that tribunal will now have to determine
whether the proper remedy requires removal of the trustee or excision oi
the limitation to white children.
4 9
On the one hand, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's original statement about
remedy was unequivocal. Should the city's participation prove to be state
action, the court reasoned, the city must be removed and the discrimination
continued with a private trustee.50 The court was not forced to this conclusion.
Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949) (policeman in response to private property
owner's request); Dawson v. Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), aff'd per curiam,
350 U.S. 877 (1955) (city operation of recreational facilities) ; St. Petersburg v. Alsup,
238 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956) (same) ; Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W.
VA. 1948) (same); cases collected note 13 supra ("private" political parties); Hxu ,
FREEDom THROUGn LAw 337-46 (1952) (explaining state action in election official cases
as that of the officials pursuant to orders of the political parties) ; Hyman, Segregation
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L. REv. 555, 566 (1951) ; Shanks, "State Action"
and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. R-v. 213 (1956) (general survey of relevant
state action cases) ; State Action, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 613 (1956) (same). Cf. Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) (labor union authorized by
federal act as exclusive bargaining unit) ; Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192,
208 (1944) (concurring opinion) (same); Ross v. Ebert, 82 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Wis.
1957) (dissenting opinion). But cf. Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 183 F.2d 440 (8th
Cir. 1950); Norris v. Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948) (distinguishing Kerr,
industrial art school which received 23% of income from city and state held not a
government instrumentality).
The most formidable obstacle to the Girard characterization is Charlotte Park and
Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 511, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 983 (1956). A donor had given property to the city for a municipal golf course
subject to an express reversion in the event that Negroes were permitted to use the
facilities. In a test action brought by the Commission, the state court held that since
the reversion was a possibility of reverter, and not a right of re-entry, it was effective
without judicial enforcement and could therefore stand. The decision is subject to varying
interpretations. Obviously the city when bringing the action was interested in more than
instruction in esoteric principles of future interest law. It already knew that a municipal
golf course could not be segregated, but wanted to find out if the threat of a reversion in
any way changed its obligation. Because the state court never mentioned the city's ad-
ministration of the golf course (which was essentially as a fiduciary), the Supreme Court,
in denying certiorari, might have reasoned that the only question decided involved th.
construction of the reverter and that the issue of discrimination was still open. In the
light of Girard this would appear to have been the case. The matter has now been
concluded by the city's acquisition of the reverter from the grantors and a court order
requiring the Commission to admit Negroes. Leeper v. Charlotte Park and Recreation
Comm'n, Superior Court, 26th Judicial Dist., N.C., February 4, 1957, reprinted in 2
RAcE Ru. L. REp. 411 (1957).
49. Upon remand from the federal Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in turn remanded to the Orphans' Court. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 26 U.S.L.
WEEiK 1005 (June 28, 1957).
50. "But finally, even if the Board of Directors of City Trusts were deemed to be
engaged in 'State action' in the administration of the Girard trust, petitioners would
nevertheless not be entitled to the remedy they seek. If the city, because bound in itb
public or governmental actions by the inhibition imposed upon it by the Fourteenth Amend-
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Cy pres, under which the tainted limitation could have been removed as against
public policy, was an available doctrine which had previously been applied to
the Girard trust.r' Thus, the trustee had been relieved from specific directions
not to sell real property or to enter into leases exceeding five years' duration.
52
And the alterations have not been exclusively administrative. In another cy
pres action, the key limitation to orphans was read to mean fatherless rather
than parentless childrenY3 Here, however, the issue was viewed as whether
Girard's primary intent was to have the city as trustee or to exclude Negroes.
Intent is always illusory, particularly when the choice obviously had never
occurred to the testator. For this reason, the Pennsylvania court's finding that
the primary purpose was to exclude Negroes is hard to refute. On the other
hand, its subsequent remand suggests that the Orphans' Court will have free
rein to find that Girard's primary purpose was to make the city trustee, and
thus to determine that excision of the racial limitation is the proper remedy.5 4
It is ironic that the alternative-removal of the trustee-should return to
plague the Orphans' Court. When first raised in the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decision the argument seemed all profit at no cost. Removal operated
as a threat, should administration of the trust be branded state action.55 It
gave the United States Supreme Court, hardpressed in more important areas
of race conflict, an excuse not to review the case.56 And its antecedents were
ment, cannot carry out a provision of Girard's will in regard to the beneficiaries of the
charity as prescribed by him, the law is clear that the remedy is, not to change that
provision, which, as an individual, he had a perfect right to prescribe, but for the Orphans'
Court, which has final jurisdiction over the trust which he created, to appoint another
trustee." Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 566, 127 A.2d 287, 295 (1956).
51. The question is close and it would appear that the court could have gone either
way depending on how it chose to interpret the testator's intent. The trustee's identity
is infrequently the source of restrictions on the trust. Under these circumstances courts
have ordered the appointment of a new trustee, Wittmeier v. Heiligenstein, 308 Ill. 434,
139 N.E. 871 (1923), distribution of the fund to the heirs, Bullard v. Shirley, 153 Mass.
559, 27 N.E. 766 (1891), and cy pres, see FiscH, THE Cy PRss DocrINE IN THE UNITn
STATES 179-81 (1950).
52. Girard Estate, 73 Pa. D. & C. 42 (1950) ; In re Petition of City of Philadelphia, 2
Brewst. 462 (Pa. C.P. 1868).
53. Soohan v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. 9 (1859).
54. See Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 26 U.S.L. WEEKIs 1005 (June 28, 1957).
55. See note 50 mipra.
56. At the time, a prediction that the Court would refuse to review the case seemed
reasonable. The close interrelationship of private and public elements presented a difficult
choice. In addition to the substantive problems, the possibility of easy evasion through
substitution of a private trustee appeared enough to persuade the Court to stay its hand.
Slight excuses had been sufficient for refusing review in the past. See Rice v. Sioux City
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70 (1955) (certiorari dismissed by the Court
because Iowa had enacted a statute giving persons similarly aggrieved in the future an
action for damages). See also Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.
2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950), where the refusal to review may be
explained by New York's subsequent enactment of an ordinance making future discrimi-
nation in such housing projects unlawful.
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above reproach-it was first used in earlier Girard opinions to discount the
heirs' claim of ultra vires against the city. 7
W1ith the court's admonition ignored, the Orphans' Court must consider the
prospects of Board removal with deep misgivings. Not only does the possibility
that the maneuver would be effective to accomplish the avowed purpose of pre-
serving racial limitation appear doubtful, such a course would have a severe im-
pact on the college. No single bank would or could assume the ninety-eight mil-
lion dollar endowment and the responsibilities of running the college. The com-
munity trust system of organization would probably have to be utilized.
Thus, policy functions would be vested in a self-perpetuating board of citizens,
and the administration and investment of the funds would be divided among
qualified Philadelphia banks.58 The opportunities and savings achieved through
large-scale investment would accordingly be diminished, and the fund would be
subject to multiple service charges from which it has heretofore been immuneY9
Unless Girard College is unique among privately endowed institutions, such a
drastic upheaval in internal management would make maintenance of its current
level of performance highly unlikely. In addition to these considerations, the
broader questions of the relationship between charitable trusts and the Four-
teenth Amendment must inevitably become an issue.
DISCRImINATORY TRUSTS AND LOCAL LAW
With the United States Supreme Court so easily finding state action in Girard,
the wisdom of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's making every decision in
57. See Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S. (2. How.) 117, 174-76 (1844) ; Philadelphia v.
Fox, 64 Pa. 169, 183 (1870).
58. Authority is divided in this manner in most community trusts. The investment and
management of the funds are the responsibility of a bank designated by the testator,
while distributions are made by a central board of trustees. For a general explanation
of the operation and structure of community trusts, see Bogert, The Conniunity Trust:
A Service Opportunity for Lawyers, 41 A.B.A.J. 587 (1955).
59. During the last few decades a depression, several wars, inflation and taxes have
brought about a revolution in the field of trust administration. One persistent drive has
been toward the consolidation of funds for investment purposes. This procedure increases
both yield and security by maximizing investment opportunities, permitting fuller in-
vestment of the funds and minimizing costs. See Stephenson, Participating Inzestinents-
The Conmmon Trust Fund Device, 12 OHio ST. L.J. 522 (1951); Comment, 58 YALE L.J.
924 (1949). Charitable institutions have felt that a pooled fund is a practical necessity.
Despite questions as to the propriety of the procedure, many universities regularly combine
special purpose funds, endowments and trusts in this manner. Blackwell, The Charitable
Corporation and the Charitable Trust, 24 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 34 n.103 (1938). A few cen-
tral church organizations provide a common trust fund for their member churches, e.g.,
Diocesan Investment Trust of the Bishop and Trustees of the Protestant Episcopal
Church in the Diocese of Massachusetts. In recognition of the advantages to collective in-
vesting, several states have enacted statutes permitting charitable corporations to pool
their various funds. E.g., PA. STAT. ATNN. tit. 15, § 2851-318 (Purdon Supp. 1956).
New costs might include trustees commissions (unless waived), expenses in buying,
selling and exchanging investments, legal fees, auditing and accounting fees and many
other costs which would become apparent only after the new system went into operation.
[Vol.66 :979
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
favor of the trust and against the Negro petitioners is sharply brought into
question. The answer lies not in prejudice or obstinacy, but in the traditional
attitudes of the law toward charitable trusts. These attitudes are not to be
lightly dismissed. They have behind them the force of a wise social policy, and
they have paid society rich dividends. The claim of discrimination is a new
weapon introduced into an age-old controversy. And the pattern of past battles
shows that the law of charitable trusts has been written, almost exclusively,
on the settlor's terms. Has the settlor who limited his bounty to whites dis-
criminated against Negroes or only exercised his recognized right to select
the specific segment of society which he wishes to benefit? The ingrained habits
of centuries permit state courts to resolve this play on words only in a way
favorable to the settlor.
At one time in England, a charitable disposition had to conform to rigid
standards of public policy. 60 The King, as spokesman of the community con-
science, could invoke a broad power to reform a gift which failed to meet public
standards, even if the resulting scheme was wholly at odds with the donor's
original intention. This power-prerogative cy pres-was not always used in
the "public interest" as viewed by modern standards. It was sometimes
applied as an instrument of religious persecution. Positive law recognized
only the established church as the gateway to salvation; gifts to other religions
were suppressed as superstitious uses.61 Against this background, it is not sur-
prising that prerogative cy pres is not now aggressively used in England 62 and
has never gained a foothold in American law. 3 Although the colonists were
not always above engaging in religious persecution themselves, they were not
disposed to bring with them a concept so associated with the absolute power
of the King. In a new country dedicated to the rights of the individual, govern-
60. 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 432 (1935); BOYLE, CHARITIES 237-80 (1837) ;
4 Scorr, TRUSTS § 399.1 (2d ed. 1956) ; TUDOR, CHARITIES 174-78 (5th ed. 1929) ; Com-
ment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L.J. 303 (1939).
61. The classic example of prerogative cy pres is Da Costa v. De Pas, 1 Amb. 228,
27 Eng. Rep. 150 (Ch. 1754). A Jewish testator left money in trust for the support of
an assembly for reading Jewish law and instructing persons in the Jewish religion. The
trust as declared void as against public policy, and the money -went to a foundling
home where, ironically, it was used to support a Christian minister and to instruct
children in the Christian religion. For the reaction of American courts to this case, see
Fisci, THE Cv PRzs DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 56-91 (1950).
62. Restrictions limiting trusts to the Christian religion have long since been removed.
The doctrine of prerogative cy pres is, nevertheless, still recognized. It has been suggested
that the authority is now vested in Parliament, Mormon Church v. United States, 136
U.S. 1, 56-58 (1890), but Professor Scott contends that it remains in the crown, 4 Scor,
TnSTS § 399.1 (2d ed. 1956). The doctrine of cy pres may well be revitalized in England
by permitting more consideration to be given to the community interest in its application.
This was one of the recommendations of a parliamentary committee on the administration
of charitable trusts. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING
TO CHARITABLE TRUSTS §§ 698-99 (1952).
63. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 576 (1867) ; Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 307-09
(1939).
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ment functioned to preserve liberties, not to impose burdens, and high on the
list of liberties was the right of every owner to control his property unaffected
by governmental intrusion.64 This heritage of personal freedom is most dra-
matically exemplified by the trust which exists in perpetuity, controlled by the
dictates of the dead and practically oblivious to the demands of the living.
Although the individual's rights have been increasingly conditioned by social
duty in other areas of the law, his position of supremacy as settlor of a trust has
remained secure. Whatever the justification might once have been, he owes
his privileged estate today to the benefits which he has conferred on society,
not to any natural rights which inhere in him as the original owner.65 The
law recognizes his privilege because the community's best interests direct that
it do so.", The world in general and the United States in particular has been
enriched beyond calculation by private philanthropy.
67
64. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 477-78 (3d ed. 1953).
65. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *10-11. See ln re Sherwood's Estate, 122 Wash.
648, 654, 211 Pac. 734, 737 (1922) : "The right of the owner of property to direct what
disposition shall be made of it after his death is not a natural right which follows from
mere ownership. On the contrary, the right has its sanction in the laws of the state having
jurisdiction over the person of the donor or jurisdiction over the property. The state
may, if it so chooses, take to itself the whole of such property, or it may take any part
thereof less than the whole and direct the disposition of the remainder; and this without
regard to the wishes or direction of the person who died possessed of it, and without
regard to the claims of those to whom he has directed that it be given. Stated in another
way, the state's power over such property is plenary, and its right to direct its disposition
unlimited. It follows from this that those claiming the property must find the foundation
for their claim, in the laws of the state. They can have no claim superior to that which
the laws give them." See also MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 194-239 (new ed. 1930). But ef.
Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906) ; Hoebel, The Anthropology
of Inheritance, N.Y.U. 1ST CONF. ON SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCETS 5 (1948).
66. Arguments in support of inheritance and the privilege of testamentary control
are: (1) the privilege of ultimate control is an incentive to accumulate wealth and gi't
maximum productive effort during life; (2) hereditary and trust wealth is a significant
source of investment capital, necessary to the continued expansion of an economy; (3)
the privilege of bequest permits continued support of dependents and is the prime source
of support for religious, cultural and charitable trusts and institutions; (4) any unfair-
ness in the institution in so far as it enriches persons already wealthy is mitigated by
the fact that most of the traditional recipients (children and spouse) have assi.ted, :i
only in intangible ways, in accumulating the wealth. Criticism of the institution tale
several forms: (1) inheritance and testamentary control aggravate and perpetuate in,quali-
ties and as such are violative of the egalitarian premises of a democratic society; (2)
selection of beneficiaries is based on such fortuities as death, survival and a fortunate
choice of parents and thus bears no relationship to the extent to which the person has
earned the bequest or is capable of putting it to wise uses; (3) prolonged dead hand coniiroI
is intolerable in that property exists for and should be subject to the demands and control
of the living; (4) receipt of large amounts of wealth may be a cause of indolence and
thus rob the community of the recipient's best productive efforts. Much of the literatur,:
on the subject has been collected and analyzed in WEDGWOOD, THE EcoNoMICS OF IxurRi-
TANCE (1929) ; see also Inheritance of Property and the Power of Tcs;amen:ary Dsp,,, '.-
tion, N.Y.U 1ST CONF. ON SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEP'rs (194M). The critics halc
had a measure of success through estate and inheritance taxes. BIT'rvEz, FEDERAL I:COMV,
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 889-904 (1955). The proponents, however, hold the ultimate
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While society understandably favors protection of the ability to create trusts
in general, this attitude does not furnish a basis for tolerating specific trusts
that are whimsical, eccentric and now discriminatory. However, the courts
have found no way to make an effective classification. Purposes worthy of com-
munity support are as diffuse as the winds. They vary wvith time. Alms to the
poor or gifts to orphan asylums, once favorites on the list of charities, are
now considered detrimental to the intended beneficiaries.0 8 The attitudes toward
charitable purposes also -vary with individual prejudices. The Ford Foundation
is a case in point. Its programs have been praised as noble, criticized as sterile
and damned as subversive.69 Because of this constant fltux, attempts to formalize
the community benefit into abstract rules inevitably degenerate into a listing of
ad hoc responses to particular situations.7" The courts have clearly perceived
these dangers 71 and have adjusted to them by accepting as charitable those
trusts which benefit a group larger than the settlor's immediate family and
trump card in that the abolition of the institution would, within a few generations, bring
about complete state ownership of all wealth. See SHULrZ, THE TAXA.Io OF INHERI-
TAN-CE 198 (1926).
Independent grounds exist for justifying the privilege when it is exercised in favor
of a charitable object. The testator's selection of beneficiaries is practically unrestrained
because (1) society receives multiple benefits in return; (2) society does not want to
discourage future property owners from dedicating their wealth to public purposes; and
(3) private charity is better adapted than government to fashlidning new and experimental
benefits for society. Stmrs, PUBLIc POLICY AND THE DEAtD HAND 132-34 (1955).
67. ANDREWS, CoRPoRATIo., GIVING (1952); ANDREWS, PHILA.fnHROPIC GIvisG
(1950); RIcH & DEADORFF, AmERIcA- FOUNDATIONS AND THEIR FIELDS (1948); TuNs,
THE M ODERN PHILANTHRopic FOUNDATION AND PRIVATE PRoPERTY (unpublished thesis
in Yale Law School Library 1947); Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 477 (1950).
68. SAIEs, PULac POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 121 (1955).
69. See MACDONALD, FORD FOUNDATION 25-35, 119-24, 167-68 (1956). The example
is somewhat disingenuous in that the Ford Foundation has launched a multitude of pro-
grams, each invoking a different public response. Frequently, however, the statements
of praise or criticism, while triggered by a single activity of the foundation, have been
general in their application.
70. Commentators do not attempt a definition. "The truth of the matter is that it is
impossible to frame a perfect definition of charitable purposes. There is no fixed standard
to determine what purposes are charitable." 4 Scorr, TRusTs 2629 (2d ed. 1956). Professor
Scott presents the subject by describing the cases. Id. at 2627-733. See also 2A BoGrar,
TRuSTS AND TRusTEEs 1-189 (1935).
71. Statements frequently appear in the cases to the effect that the judge's personal
appraisal of the wisdom or utility of the trust is irrelevant. See Lewis's Estate, 152 Pa.
477, 25 AtI. 878 (1893) ; ZOLLMANx, AmRCAN LAW OF CHAITIES 148-49 (1924). Only
a few trusts of the many processed each year are rejected. A sampling includes: Zeisweiss
v. James, 63 Pa. 465 (1870) (gift to an "Infidel Society") ; In re Hill's Estate, 119 WNTash.
62, 204 Pac. 1055 (1922) (income to be used for instruction in homeopathic medicine);
Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Clyde, 143 Conn. 247, 121 A2d 625 (1956) (trust to publish
testator's pornographic works invalid as against public policy although educational or litcr-
ary merit of trust-distributed books ordinarily is no concern of the courts). It is not
uncommon for the invalidity of a trust to be explained on grounds of indefiniteness or un-
certainty rather than the more opprobrious label of public policy. See. e.g., Matter of
Carpenter, 163 Misc. 474, 297 N.Y. Supp. 649 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
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friends, and which are not affirmatively absurd, obscene, illegal, excessively
selfish or specifically offensive to some considerable segment of the popula-
tion.72 The discriminatory trust is easily engulfed in these calm waters leaving
scarcely a ripple behind.
Attacks on such a trust may originate from various sources. In Girard,
the action was brought by two victims of the discrimination. In other cases,
the moving party might be a disappointed heir, the trustee, a state's attorney
general or tax commissioner. From whatever quarter the action is launched,
trust law will reshape it into one of three issues: the validity of the trust as a
charity; the applicability of cy pres to the exclusionary clause; or the availa-
bility of a tax exemption. Obviously these issues are related, each posing a
common question of public policy. They differ only in the time and place of
litigation.
The traditional attitude of the law is presented at creation of the trust when
charitable status is questioned; the other two actions are merely variants on
the same theme. Orthodox theory labels a trust charitable if it combines a
worthy purpose with a sufficiently broad classification of beneficiaries. And
charitable purpose will be established if the gift is within one of the thousand
and one categories-education, relief of poverty and the like-accepted in past
decisions.73 As the law turns from the purpose to the group through which
that purpose is to be achieved, one of the frequent compromises between the
ideal and the practical must be made. Society, not a specific group of individuals,
is the true beneficiary. But society is no more than its individual members,
some not as qualified or desirous of utilizing the benefits as others. Here the
law assumes that benefit to a few is benefit to all. A trust for a particular
church is of immediate benefit only to the parishioners of that church. Legally
the trust is nonetheless charitable; since society in general is uplifted by the
spirituality of any of its members, financial contributions encouraging spiritual
endeavor should be favored. Obviously, this rationale can be extended prac-
tically without limit. And the cases illustrate how seldom courts interfere
with a settlor's desires. A property owner may designate beneficiaries by sex.
age, geographical location or religion.7 4 So great is the leeway accorded him
72. Admittedly this description of the process contains its share of ambiguities. It has
the advantage, however, of indicating that the initial presumption is one of validity. A
fuller understanding of the process would require a comprehensive analysis of not only
the stated purpose of the gift but all other variables as well, including identification of
the persons who would otherwise receive the property, the amount involved and the con-
ditions under which the gift was made. See McDOUGAL & HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH,
LAND 246-51 (1948).
73. The text discussion assumes a valid charitable purpose. This assumption covers
a multitude of difficulties. Analysis of the charitable trust in the context of discrimination
defies generalization because the discriminatory provisions, rather than standing alone, are
part of an over-all charitable scheme which may take an infinite variety of forms. And
it is conceivable that certain purposes might justify a racial limitation. See text at notes
131-132 infra.
74. See cases collected in ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARIVIES 286-98 (1924);
4 ScoTr, TRusTs §§ 369.5, 370.6, 371, 372.2, 375 (2d ed. 1956).
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that opinion is not even unanimous as to a limitation to his relatives; in some
jurisdictions at least, charity can virtually begin at home." In this context
discrimination becomes only another form of permissible selection.
7
6
When the validity of the limitation is considered at the creation of the trust,
society's stake in the matter seems almost negligible. The choice is usually
between toleration of a doubtful trust or an award of the property to heirs
whom the testator had, at least to the extent of the gift, disinherited. But the
courts fail to recognize the possibility that their initial determination may govern
future litigation in which the community interest may appear in a different light.
Accepting a trust for enforcement and subsidizing it with tax immunities, for
example, are distinct issues.7 Yet in the run of cases the two are handled
in like manner.78 Although both state and federal tax exemptions are regulated
by statute, the purposes listed in the statutes are practically coextensive with
75. Compare Matter of Beekman, 232 N.Y. 365, 134 N.E. 183 (1922) (bequest to
corporation formed to educate members of the testator's family or aid his poor descendants
or ancestors not charitable) with Goodale v. Mooney, 60 N.H. 528 (1881) (property to
be distributed at discretion of executor among benevolent objects and testator's relatives
valid). See Annot., 131 A.L.R. 1277 (1941) ; 4 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 375.3 (2d ed. 1956).
76. ZOLLMANN, AmEICAN LAW OF CHARITIES § 423 (1924). The settlor's freedom
to discriminate may be curtailed by state statute. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 313 (prohibition
against discrimination in private education). See Note, Fair Educational Practices Acts:
.4 Solution to Discrinination?, 64 HARy. L. REv. 307 (1950).
77. Not all states grant tax exemptions to trusts which are sufficiently charitable to
be enforced. Pennsylvania, for instance, exempts only institutions of "purely public charity"
and that term has been construed to be narrower in scope than charity in the general sense.
PA. CONST art. IX, § 1, Hill School Tax Exemption Case, 370 Pa. 21, 87 A.2d 259 (1952)
(distinction depends on whether the institution is entirely free from private profit).
78. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §§ 12.05-.17 (1942). But see Susan
Young Eagan, 17 B.T.A. 694, 702 (1929), rev'd, 43 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1930) :
"Since the issue arises under the Federal revenue act, it must, so far as practicable,
be swept clear of confusions in various jurisdictions as to charities, charitable uses
and charitable trusts. The historical development, since the Statute of Elizabeth,
of the law relating to charitable trusts both in England and the United States has
taken place independently of the law relating to taxation. The definitions and impli-
cations have arisen out of social and political circumstances having little or no relation
to government revenue. In their setting, apart from taxation, they are various and
conflicting in different jurisdictions, that which is firmly fixed as a charity in one
State being unrecognized in another. Even as to local taxes, the exemptions of
each State differ from those of others. While it must be recognized that the deduction
of charitable bequests provided in the revenue act was conceived by a purpose to
encourage public charity, . . . it is not necessary for the fulfillment of this purpose
to import all of the judicial dicta which have been used to safeguard the chancery
power.
"The administration of this Act must, in matters such as this, transcend any
local law of statute or decision .... [T]here would be hopeless confusion if deduc-
tion were allowed of a bequest because the State of decedent's domicile recognized
it as charitable in consonance with the Statute of Elizabeth, and denied a similar
bequest of a decedent residing in a State holding a different view."
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the categories recognized by the general law.79 Limits are imposed only on
trusts for personal or family benefit; any other restrictions on the composition
of a permissible class are presumably determined by traditional doctrine. Both
federal and state taxing authorities appear to grant tax exemption to racially
selective trusts as a matter of course, probably because no authority has ever
denied the exemption.80
Cy pres gives the problem still another dimension. The settlor is assumed
to have been an intelligent and responsible citizen. Had he foreseen the future
course of public policy, it is argued, he would not have intended his limitation
to continue. This reasoning has the virtue of accomplishing the public purpose
within the framework of the settlor's intent. Here, again, the traditions of
judicial restraint often foreclose sensible solution.81 If cy pres may properly
be applied to a trust, the court will not hesitate to manufacture, in the settlor's
name, a use for the funds more compatible with contemporary community
values.8 2 But accepted doctrine allows application of cy pres only when imple-
mentation of the settlor's specific purpose is difficult, impossible or illegal.8,
To exclude Negroes is neither difficult nor impossible. Illegality poses the same
question confronting the courts at creation of the trust. Since a private citizen
may discriminate, he is merely selecting his beneficiaries as the law allows when
he projects his prejudices beyond life.
8 4
79. INT. Rtv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 501, 2055, 2522. For the most part state inheritance
tax statutes substantially parallel the federal exemptions with the exception that thirty-
four states and territories have provisions which impose a tax on non-resident charitie.
4 CCH INn. EST. & GIFT TAX REP. 1 12,020 (1956).
80. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), ccrt.
denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950). The New York court rejected by a 4-3 decision the argument
that a grant of substantial tax immunity to a housing corporation constituted state action.
At least for the time being, the matter of tax exemptions is assumed to be controlled by
this decision. See note 96 infra. There is, however, a point beyond which the settlor
may not go. See note 8 supra.
81. To apply cy pres, the court must find a general charitable intent within which a
new specific use may be designated. It is thus the intent of the settlor rather than the com-
munity interest that is primary. On this ground the doctrine of cy pres has been repeatedly
criticized. See Comment, A Revalvation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 323 (1939) ; 2A
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 436 (1935). It has been suggested that Pennsylvania,
having recently enacted a statute which eliminates the requirement of general charitable in-
tent, PA. STAT. A x. tit. 20, § 301.10 (Purdon Supp. 1956), may now give greater considera-
tion to the public welfare. See FiscH, THE CY PREs DOCTRINE INT THE UNrrED STATES § 5.03
(b), (c) (1950) ; Note, Cy Pres in Pennsylvania, 54 DIcK. L. REV. 77 (1949). The approach
of the Pennsylvania courts to the Girard case would appear to belie this prediction.
82. McKee Estate, 83 Pa. D. & C. 492, 520, aff'd per curiam, 378 Pa. 607, 108 A.2d
214 (1954): "The Court possesses the broadest possible powers for the application of
this fund to fulfill the purposes of the will even to the extent of awarding all of it, principal
and income, to an independent agency so long as that agency's purposes conform to what
the Court regards as Colonel McKee's intention .. " In line with this statement, once
a court decides to apply cy pres, the only limit on its discretion is the general outline of
the testator's intent. Since the court discussed various alternative plans for the use of the
funds, McKee is an excellent example of the potential breadth of court discretion.
83. RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 399 (1935).
84. Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 558-60, 127 A.2d 287, 291-93 (1956).
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This logic hardly defeats contrary argument. Classification by race is alto-
gether different in psychological origin and effect from other methods of classi-
fying beneficiaries. It is designed to hurt, not to benefit, and sociologists tell
us that such is its effect.8 5 The malevolence of racial selection is the antithesis
of charity, and therein might be found the basis for a legal distinction. But
such an approach encounters the difficulties which fostered the traditional rule
of restraint. Should a trust for the exclusive benefit of Negroes, for example,
be distinguished from other types of racial selection? It can be argued that
the second-class status which has been forced on the Negro by the dominant
white majority provides an affirmative reason for such a classification. Or
can the purpose justify a racial limitation? If discrimination is a criterion, a
trust for white Southern boys is on its face improper. But what if the purpose
is to educate such boys in Northern universities on the legal and sociological
background of desegregation? Inevitably a public policy which is called upon
to make the distinctions suggested by these hypotheticals will be rooted in the
prejudices of judges, not in consistent principles. A new power, heretofore
admirably kept in check, will be loosed, upsetting the delicate balance which
has so long prevailed and paving the way for a general and more aggressive
censorship of the testator's designs.80
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Despite this danger, a maliciously discriminatory charitable trust remains
an intolerable contradiction. That state courts offer no remedy is perhaps of
85. KARDINER & OVESEY, TEE MARK OF OPPRESSION (1951); Caliver, Segregation in
American Education: An Overview, 304 ANNALS 17 (1956) ; Note, Grade School Segrega-
tlion: The Latest Attack on Racial Discrimination, 61 YALE L.J. 730 (1952).
86. For the civil libertarian, no satisfactory solution exists. He may abhor discrimi-
nation in all its forms, but if a heavier hand is to be applied to charitable trusts it will
be those purposes that are new, imaginative and experimental which will be most seriously
affected. The argument for free philanthropy has recently been summarized as follows:
"Another danger in control is even more serious. In America, private enterprise
has been creative not only in business but in welfare. From private welfare enter-
prise have come most of the new ventures, most of the pioneering research, most
of the improved techniques that have set the pace of our social progress. Failures
have occurred; but many of these have also been useful in pointing out ways not to
go. The essential ingredient is freedom to experiment.
"This freedom must be a real freedom. Its grantors may not safely forbid even
experiments that seem hopeless of success. If a scientific control board had sat over
the Wright brothers, it would have pointed out that reputable scientists of the day
were convinced that flight by heavier-than-air machines was impossible, and might
have forbidden the experiment that succeeded at Kitty Hawk."
Andrews, Introduction, TAYLOR, PUBLIc ACCOUNTABILITY OF FOUNDATIONS AND CHARIT-
ABLE TRUSTS vi (1953). Society can ill afford to lose those trusts which seek to explore
new horizons. Philanthropy is already too prone to be conservative and cautious, a character-
istic which becomes more pronounced as the funds involved increase in amount. MACDONALD,
Ford FOUNDATION 165-74 (1956); Embree, Timid Billions, Harper's, March, 1949
p. 28, 31.
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slight significance, since local public policy will not in any event achieve a
national solution. It is inconceivable that a Southern court would find a segre-
gated trust noncharitable or unenforceable as against public policy.87 This
pitfall could be avoided by application of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.8" Yet requiring the discriminatory charitable trut
to conform to the standards of equal protection of the laws may disrupt the
essential foundations of the over-all institution in which the segregated trust is
so small a part unless the amendment can be confined to the specific evil which
it was designed to correct.
As the doctrine of "separate but equal" disappears from the stage, the spot-
light turns full strength on the identity of the agency which has committed
the discrimination. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
extends only to action by a state or some subdivision thereof.80 The process
of adjudication seems easy; either the facts demonstrate governmental inter-
vention or they do not. However, for all their ambiguities, the cases demon-
strate that race problems are not to be solved by the formal application of a label
alone. "State action"--in terms of result, action which falls within the purview
of the equal protection clause-is, like most labels, a term of shifting content.
Its application requires two elements conjoined: governmental action in fact,
and governmental action in a context of sufficiently grave social implication
to persuade the Supreme Court of the necessity of federal correction.
State Action in Fact
In Girard, the Negro applicants appeared to have the best of the argument.
The discrimination was conceded, and an administrative agency of the city was
a party to it. Petitioners referred only obliquely to the state action inherent
in charitable trusts generally, 9 since the city's trusteeship alone seemed to
establish state action. The discrimination emanated directly from the Board;
and the more inclusive argument posed a threat to every charitable trust, with
resulting tactical disadvantages to anyone who dared make it. Ultimately peti-
tioners were successful on the narrow ground; the bolder approach clearly
would not have accelerated their victory. For the majority opinion in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed the argument as too inconceivable to
87. See, e.g., Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311,
88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
88. See Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212, 215 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 721 (1945); Hamilton & Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme
Court, 50 YALE L.J. 1319, 1354-55 (1941).
89. The Supreme Court is careful to emphasize the immunity of private action even
when at its boldest in applying the Fourteenth Amendment. See Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 13 (1949) ("that Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful"). See also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-19
(1883).
90. The participation of the legislature through enactment of implementing statutes,
visitations and general supervision was emphasized in both the majority and dissenting
opinions. Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 615, 127 A.2d 287, 318 (1956).
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contemplate."' And the concurring opinion viewed its ramifications on a level
of catastrophe with an atomic attack.
92
That the implications of the argument are far-reaching cannot hide the state's
total involvement in the charitable trust. In Shelley v. Kraemer, no judicial
action was necessary to bring the covenants into existence or to make them
effective if the parties chose to honor their terms.93 But the charitable trust
has no such original vitality. The power to dispose of property at death is a
privilege granted by law and supervised through probate and administration
by courts and judicially appointed fiduciaries. While these incidents of minis-
terial control have been thought too slight to constitute state action, the state's
role in a charitable trust is all this and much more.94 The trust becomes operative
91. "It is perfectly clear, therefore, that private trusts for charitable purposes, not
being subject to or controlled by 'State action,' are wholly beyond the orbit
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such trusts abound in overwhelming numbers and
there can be no question as to their legality however limited be the class of their
beneficiaries or whatever be the nature or basis of their restrictions; charitable
trusts for limited groups, whether racial or religious, are as valid as if for all the
people of the world. We have charitable trusts for ministers of various church
denominations, for foreign missions, for churches, priests, Catholics, Protestants,
Jews, whites, negroes, for relief of the Indians, for widows or orphan children
of Masons or other fraternities, for sectarian old folks homes, orphanages, and
so on. Certainly no one would contend that a donor or a testator could not establish
a charity, the beneficiaries of which were to be those whom he designated,-persons
of any prescribed race, creed or color, or however otherwise differentiated. The
court is concerned only with the legal right of such selection by a donor or testator
and not with whatever illiberalism he may display in his exercise of the right."
Id. at 560, 127 A.2d at 292-93.
92. "If the present contention of the City is correct, its effect will be catastrophic
on testamentary church and charitable bequests, as well as on the law of Wills in
Pennsylvania. The constitutional prohibition against discrimination-the Fourteenth
Amendment-is not confined to color; it prohibits the States from making any dis-
crimination because of race, creed or color. It follows logically and necessarily
that if an individual cannot constitutionally leave his money to an orphanage or to
a private home and college for poor white male orphans, he cannot constitutionally
leave his money to a Catholic, or Episcopal, or Baptist, or Methodist, or Lutheran
or Presbyterian Church; or to a Synagogue for Orthodox Jews; or to a named
Catholic Church or to a named Catholic priest for Masses for the repose of his soul,
or for other religious or charitable purposes. That would shock the people of
Pennsylvania and the people of the United States more than a terrible earthquake
or a large atomic bomb." Id. at 613, 127 A.2d at 318 (concurring opinion).
93. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
94. Inequality is basic to the institution of inheritance and testamentary disposition.
Although state courts assist in the process through probate, administration and distribution,
it does not thereby become actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. The argument
has been made and summarily rejected that the courts, on analogy to Shelley v. Kraemer,
may not enforce a discriminatory condition to a private gift or trust. See Gordon v. Gordon,
332 Mass. 197, 208, 124 N.E.2d 228, 235, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955) ; United States
Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 202 Ore. 530, 275 P.2d 860 (1954). A judicially appointed
fiduciary has been held not to be an agent or representative of the state within the
meaning of the state action concept. See Wilcox v. Horan, 178 F2d 162, 165 (10th
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only after a court has found, either specifically or by inference, that it is charit-
able.95 Nor has government remained neutral. To encourage a continuous flow
of funds into philanthropic enterprises, it bestows privileges, of which tax im-
munity is only one.96 The state creates and defines charitable trusts, grants
them perpetual existence, modernizes them through cy pres, appoints and regu-
lates the trustees, approves accounts, construes ambiguous language in the trust
charter and sometimes goes so far as to impose a less stringent standard of tort
liablity on such trusts than on their private counterpartsY7 These are practical
benefits, granted or witheld by the action of government.
But governmental participation does not end with these benefits. The con-
cept of a fiduciary's stewardship required a trustee to be accountable to some-
body. A court alone was not enough. 8 Some other agency was needed to bring
Cir. 1949); Whittington v. Johnston, 201 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1953). The claims of the
Fourteenth Amendment are not as easily dismissed when the property has been dedicated
to public purposes. See text at note 121 infra.
95. When a testamentary trust is involved the approval of the accounts constitutes
an approval of the charitable purpose. An inter vivos trust may go into actual operation
without judicial action. It is not, however, entitled to the privileges accorded a charitabk
trust such as tax exemption until some official has passed on its validity.
96. It is doubtful whether the split decision in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299
N.Y. 512, 87 N.F_2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950), has put the question
of tax exemptions to rest. Direct governmental subsidization of private activities which
are discriminatory constitutes prohibited state action. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library,
149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945). Tax exemptions operate as a
sudsidy which must be offset by higher taxes on non-exempt persons and organizations.
These privileges cannot be excused as insignificant, for many charitable institutions could
not survive if they were withheld. In Girard, for instance, annual tax exemptions are in excess
of half a million dollars. The anomaly of doing by indirection what cannot be done
directly is obvious. For discussion of the policy which underlies the exemption, see Eaton,
Charitable Foundations and Related Matters Under the 1950 Revenue Act, 37 VA. L. R.
1, 2-16 (1951) ; Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation,
14 LAw & CoNTlop. PROB. 143, 148-52 (1949). On the extent to which property owners
avail themselves of the privilege, see Harriss, Federal Estate Taxes and Philanthropic
Bequests, 57 J. POL. EcoN. 337 (1949). One element of the charitable trust problem which
may discourage the courts from reappraising the validity of such exemptions is the far-
reaching effects inherent in any reversal of policy. It would bring all private education
under a new type of control and would raise questions in a cognate area as to whether
religious exemptions are violative of the principles of separation of church and state which
is embodied in the First Amendment. See PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 183-91
(1953); Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 426, 432-33
(1953); Paulsen, supra; Punke, Religious Issues in American Public Education, 20 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 138, 154-57 (1955).
97. For a variety of reasons, including the fear of depleting what are essentially
public funds and an analogy to governmental immunity, many decisions have held charitable
organizations free from tort liability. Compare Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 78
N.E. 855 (1906), with Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (1942). See also 4
ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 402-03 (2d ed. 1956) ; 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 241-54 (1935) ;
Williams, Public Charities Not Liable for Tort in Pennsylvania, 54 DicK. L. REv. 6
(1949). The immunity, where granted, emphasizes the public nature of charitable operations.
98. Indeed, in the early history of American trust law, several states denied Vquit,
courts power to enforce charitable trusts without enabling legislation. See Trustees of the
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the trustee before the court and demand an accounting. 9 Private trusts posed
no problem: the beneficiaries, acting out of self-interest, would hold a trustee
true to his obligations. But the beneficiaries of a charitable trust might be the
peoples of the world; to vest the enforcement power in such an unconfined
group was administratively impossible. In England, the gap was originally
bridged by giving the regulatory power to the crown, acting through the Attor-
ney General or Commissioners appointed by the Chancellor.100 Eventually all the
states in this country, either by statute or decision, followed suit and vested
responsibility for enforcement in a governmental official, usually the attorney
general. 1' 1
Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819) (juris-
diction over charitable trusts existed only as granted by the Statute of Elizabeth). This
decision was later conceded to be based on an erroneous interpretation of the relevant
history, but by the time the Court had rectified its error in Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43
U.S. (2. How.) 117 (1844), the earlier doctrine was too firmly entrenched in several
states to be altered. The states affected included Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New
York, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia. In those juris-
dictions the confusion engendered by the doctrine that an outright gift to a charitable
corporation was valid, but a charitable trust failed for want of enforcement procedures,
was resolved only after years of travail and, finally, the enactment of statutes. See Black-
well, The Charitable Corporation and the Charitable Trust, 24 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1 (1938) ;
Lincoln, A Question on Gifts to Charitable Corporations, 25 VA. L. REv. 764 (1939);
Taylor, A New Chapter in the New York Law of Charitable Corporations, 25 CORNELL
L.Q. 382 (1940). The lesson was costly, including a much-needed library for New
York City. See Tilden v. Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 880 (1891). The New York
statute, known as the Tilden Act, now appears as N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 113, N.Y.
PEAS. PROP. LAw § 12.
99. Early Virginia authority recognized that the deficiency resulted not only from
failure to give the court jurisdiction, but also from want of a procedure for initiating
enforcement. "In short, there cannot be a trust without a cestid que trust; and if it
cannot be ascertained who the cestii que trust is, it is the same thing as if there was none."
Gallego's Ex'rs v. Attorney Gen., 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 450, 466 (1832).
100. The Statute of Elizabeth, 1601, 43 ELiz. 1, c. 4, provided for supervision through
the appointment of Commissioners by the Chancellor. Even before that time, chancery had
recognized and enforced charitable trusts at the request of the Attorney General. The
remedial sections of the Statute of Elizabeth gradually fell into disuse and were ultimately
repealed in 1888. Because enforcement by the Attorney General was cumbersome and
inefficient, parliament enacted the Charitable Trusts Act, 1853, 16 & 17 Vicr., c. 137,
whereby supervision of all trusts was vested in a four-man board, known as the Charity
Cormissioners for England and Wales. Authority over educational purposes was later
transferred to the Board of Education. 62 & 63 VIcT., c. 33 (1899). The relevant statutes
are set out and discussed in TUDOR, CHARITIES 484-552, 680-84 (1929). See also BOURcHIER
& CmLcoTT, ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITIES (1912); MITCHESON, CHARITABLE TRUSTS
(1887); 4 Scorr, TRUSTS § 348.2 (2d ed. 1956).
101. 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 411 (1935) ; 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 391 (2d ed.
1956). Enforcement by the attorney general's office has left much to be desired. Among
the multitude of responsibilities vested in that office, charitable trusts rank as relatively
minor. Accordingly, supervision is sporadic, depending for the most part on specific com-
plaints by citizens. A growing movement in recent years advocates strengthening the office
and obtaining more effective supervision by establishing therein a registry of charitable
1957] 1005
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
In the venerable case of Morice v. Bishop of Durham, a court for the first
time indicated that enforcement procedures were prerequisite to validity.102 The
gift in question was to the Bishop of Durham in trust for such objects of "be-
nevolence and liberality" as he should choose.' 0 3 The trust was clearly not
private; no specific beneficiaries had been designated. And "benevolence and
liberality" were terms too broad to be characterized as charitable, so that the
trust fell outside the Attorney General's authority. Because duty without a corre-
lative power of enforcement was indistinguishable from absolute ownership, the
trust failed, and the property returned to the estate. Thus early trust law made
state action a necessary part of the charitable trust concept. Governmental
involvement did not await an actual default by a trustee. The attorney general's
authority to initiate enforcement proceedings had to be established before the
trust could be allowed even initial existence.
Modern authority with one exception still adheres to the rule as a matter
of practical necessity. Prompted perhaps by Professor Ames' cogent criticisms
of the reasoning in the Bishop of Durham case-he thought the possibility that
the Bishop would fail to fulfill his obligations too unlikely to justify invalidating
the trust 104-courts have occasionally allowed non-private trusts for specific,
short-term, non-charitable purposes. If enforcement proves necessary, the per-
sons otherwise entitled to the property are the proper parties to initiate the
action.' 0 5 But as the label-honorary-attached to such trusts indicates, in the
last analysis compliance depends on the trustee's own good faith. Furthermore,
although the omission of effective enforcement procedures does not foreclose the
trust's creation, duration is limited to the period allowed by the rule against per-
petuities.10 6 This exception, although demonstrating that the Bishop of Durham
trusts which would contain the information necessary for an evaluation of any trust's
performance. Progress in this direction has been made by New Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode
Island and South Carolina. Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regardig State Supervision
of Charities, 52 MICH. L. REv. 633 (1954) ; see also TAYLOR, PtmULIC AccouNTABILiTY oF
FoUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS 23-49, 124-39, 143-49 (1953) (analysis of responses
to questionnaire on effectiveness of existing enforcement machinery).
102. 9 Ves. 399, 32 Eng. Rep. 656 (Ex. 1804).
103. Ibid.
104. Ames, The Failure of the "Tilden Trust," 5 HAv. L. REv. 389 (1892). This
controversy has always intrigued the great scholars of trust law. Professor Scott is the
modern spokesman for the Ames point of view. See Scott, Trusts for Charitable and
Benevolent Purposes, 58 HARv. L. REv. 548 (1945), 2 Scomr, TRUSTS §§ 123-24 (2d ed.
1956). But see 1A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 166 (1935) ; Gray, Gifts for a Non-
Charitable Purpose, 15 HARv. L. REv. 509 (1902).
105. American courts have applied the honorary trust doctrine by name in only a few
instances. The usual situation involves a trust for a pet. See In re Estate of Searight, 87
Ohio App. 417, 95 N.E,2d 779 (1950). See also 2 Scorr, TRUSTS § 124 (2d ed. 1956). When
an attempt to apply the doctrine outside its traditional categories is made, courts tend to be
unimpressed. See, e.g., Fidelity Title and Trust Co. v. Clyde, 143 Conn. 247, 121 A.2d 625
(1956).
106. SiMEs & SmITH, THE LAw oF FUTURE INTM STS § 1394 (1956); Smith,
Honorary Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 30 COLUm. L. REv. 60 (1930).
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rule is not fixed, everlasting and inexorable, has little relevance to the practicali-
ties of enforcing a long-term charitable trust.
0 7
Although judicial action guarantees enforcement whatever the agency bring-
ing the trust before the court, the issue of the agent's identity may be crucial
in determining the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to such trusts.
Court action other than enforcement may not be considered state action. 08 Be-
cause the same degree of uncertainty does not exist when an executive officer
of the government is a participant,10 9 it is highly significant -that the attorney
general is in fact presently recognized as the proper party to set a court in
motion."10 His power to do so may not always be exclusive; those given a special
equity by the terms of the trust are sometimes accorded standing to sue."'1 But
107. The issue is not without a measure of confusion in Pennsylvania. In It re Dulles'
Estate, 218 Pa. 162, 67 Atl. 49 (1907), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, considering a
disposition for religious, charitable and benevolent objects, found it unnecessary to de-
termine whether a benevolent purpose constituted a technical charity; an intent clear
enough for the court to enforce was sufficient. Although the decision can be read to
allow a trust that is neither private nor charitable, 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS 860-61 (2d ed. 1956),
later Pennsylvania cases indicate that the burden of policing such trusts is on the Attorney
General. Compare Wiegand v. Barnes Foundation, 374 Pa. 149, 97 A.2d 81 (1953) ; it re
Miller Estate, 380 Pa. 172, 110 A.2d 200 (1955) with In re Mears's Estate, 299 Pa. 217,
149 Ati. 157 (1930) ; it re Thompson's Estate, 282 Pa. 30, 127 Atl. 446 (1925) ; In re
Barnwell's Estate, 269 Pa. 443, 112 Atl. 535 (1921). Some cases refer to the broad visitorial
powers of the Orphans' Court to supervise charitable trusts. See It re Toner's Estate, 260
Pa. 49, 103 At. 541 (1918). The general statute on correcting breaches of charitable
trusts which speaks of "any person or persons interested in the due execution of the trust"
bringing the action does not specifically designate the Attorney General as the moving
party. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2874 (Purdon Supp. 1956). In the cy pres statute, the
Attorney General is mentioned along with other interested persons as a proper party
to petition the court. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.10 (Purdon Supp. 1956).
108. See Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228, cert. denied, 349 U.S.
947 (1955) (judicial administration of private trust not state action); United States
Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 202 Ore. 530, 275 P.2d 860 (1954) (same).
109. Since the decision of an attorney general not to participate in an action on an
alleged breach of trust is not subject to judicial review, mandamus will not lie against him.
Ames v. Attorney Gen., 332 Mass. 246, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955).
110. See In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Soc'y, 112 Adv. Cal. App. 446, 246 P.2d
1029 (1952), modified on other grounds, 40 Cal. 2d 852, 257 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 346
U.S. 888 (1953) ; Trustees of New Castle Common v. Gordy, 33 Del. Ch. 196, 91 A.2d
135 (1952) ; Kolin v. Leitch, 343 Ill. App. 622, 99 N.E.2d 685 (1951) ; Boice v. Mailers,
121 Ind. App. 210, 96 N.E.2d 342 (1950) ; In re Owens' Estate, 244 Ia. 533, 57 N.W.2d
193 (1953); Schaeffer v. Newberry, 227 Minn. 259, 35 N.W.2d 287 (1948); In re
Estate of Grblny, 147 Neb. 117, 22 N.W.2d 488 (1946) ; In the Matter of Estate of Pfizer,
33 N.J. Super. 242, 110 A.2d 40 (1954) ; Goetz v. Old Nat'l Bank, 84 S.E.2d 759 (Sup.
Ct. App. W. Va. 1954). See, generally, Annots., 124 A.L.R. 1237-42 (1940), 62 A.L.R.
881-904 (1929). For a breakdown of the enforcement procedures in eighteen states,
see TAYLOR, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY OF FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS 148-49
(1953). In some states the obligation to enforce charitable trusts is imposed by statute.
4 ScoTT, TRUSTS 2754 (2d ed. 1956) ; 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs § 411 (1935).
111. The trustee may, of course, initiate a construction proceeding or ask for instruc-
tions. Carlisle v. Delaware Trust Co., 99 A.2d 764 (Del. 1953). A trustee may sue
a co-trustee for breach. Morville v. Fowle, 144 Mass. 109, 10 N.E. 766 (1887). And a
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proper procedure requires that the attorney general at least be made a party
to the action in any case."
2
Accordingly, the administration of a charitable trust must ultimately be
characterized as state action. Basic to the grant of enforcement powers to the
attorney general was the law's realization that the words of the dead are only
as effective as living society, acting through its governmental agents, chooses
to make them. Whether the trustee is a governmental unit, as in Girard, or a
private trust company, the trustee's choice is only first, not final. In the event
that he refuses to carry out the testator's limitation, the discrimination can
become operative only if the attorney general brings an action on the breach,
and the courts command compliance. Under these circumstances, the full
panoply of governmental powers stands behind the discrimination. Less obvious
is the situation where the trustee exercises the limitation without outside prompt-
ing.113 The burden of going forward now shifts from the trustee to the attorney
general. He may, on the assumption that his primary duty is to the settlor,
acquiesce in the discrimination. Nevertheless, since the trustee acts without
restraint only upon such acquiesence, the attorney general again becomes a
participant in the discrimination.
The Girard case might offer the trustee an escape from this tangled web,
since there the identity of the trustee was controlling. A trustee could claim
the discrimination as his own, and therefore private, and further argue that
the attorney general and the courts have no standing to intervene to make it
public. This premise, however, overlooks the nature of the relationship between
person with a special interest in the trust may seek enforcement. Kolin v. Leitch, supra
note 110. However, a citizen without a special interest has no standing to sue. Averill v.
Lewis, 106 Conn. 582, 138 Atl. 815 (1927); Dickey v. Volker, 321 Mo. 235, 11 S.W.2d
278 (1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 839 (1929) ; Wiegand v. Barnes Foundation, 374 Pa. 149,
97 A.2d 81 (1953). The settlor, his heirs or contributors are not usually allowed to sue
for enforcement. Greenway v. Irvine's Trustee, 279 Ky. 632, 131 S.W.2d 705 (1939);
Leeds v. Harrison, 15 N.J. Super. 82, 83 A.2d 45 (1951). Contra, Carter v. Mayor,
197 Md. 70, 78 A.2d 212 (1951). In Wisconsin, if the Attorney General refuses to act,
ten or more interested citizens may bring the action in the name of the state. WIs. STAT.
§ 231.34 (1955).
112. Thurlow v. Berry, 247 Ala. 631,25 So.2d 726 (1946); Kolin v. Leitch, 343 Ill. App.
622, 99 N.E.2d 685 (1951) ; Carlisle v. Delaware Trust Co., supra note 111; In the Matter
of Estate of Grblny, 147 Neb. 117,22 N.W.2d 488 (1946). When the matter is of no interest
to the public, the attorney general is not a necessary party. Delaware Trust Co. v. Graham, 30
Del. Ch. 330, 61 A.2d 110 (1948) ; Burtman v. Butman, 94 N.H. 412, 54 A.2d 367 (1947);
cf. Attorney Gen. v. Clark, 167 Mass. 201, 45 N.E. 183 (1896).
113. This analysis assumes that the trust charter contains a racial limitation. The
problem takes on an additional dimension when the discrimination is not required by the
terms of the trust, but is imposed solely at the discretion of the trustee. If the trustee
is an individual or a private corporation, it can be argued that the discrimination results
exclusively from private action. But, again, the trustee's discretion is in no sense absolute,
for he cannot exercise it in a manner that is illegal or violative of public policy. See note
44 supra. Moreover, the problem remains as to whether the issue of public policy depends
on a court's determination of the state action question. Cf. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free
Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
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the trustee and the trust property. In the Girard litigation, only the alternatives
of attributing the discrimination to the settlor or the trustee were considered.
Trust law demonstrates another reference point. True, a trustee does not lose
his personal identity when he assumes his fiduciary office. But the law does
not thereby make the trust property his own. He is in no sense in the position
of a private contractor who may voluntarily fulfill the terms of the trust agree-
ment. On the contrary, he may utilize the trust property only as the law requires.
The trustee is forced on this account to justify discrimination as an obligation
imposed by law. Yet an obligation exists only on the assumption that the state
will retaliate if he breaches. Because retaliation is proscribed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the obligation and the attendant justification disappear.114 The
trustee is, therefore, in reality an agent of the law; for the attorney general
and the courts, by direct or threatened action, will ultimately control his course.
Charitable Trusts in Context
In the last analysis, all human activity is controlled by law. That state action
in fact is involved should not, standing alone, support invocation of the equal
protection clause.1"0 If Shelley v. Kraemer means that judicial action is state
action in every context, it would become a mere procedural matter to make
ejectment of an undesired guest from a tea party actionable discrimination. But
obviously the Supreme Court has no intent to make the Fourteenth Amendment
an omnipotent over-law regulating all conduct and usurping much of the tra-
ditional jurisdiction of state courts. In this light, the cases indicate that state
action requires a qualitative evaluation of the total context within which the
discrimination arose.
Certainly, state action will remain the principal legal question involved, as
the Fourteenth Amendment requires. But it is sometimes an awkward tool
with which to solve the delicate problems of race relations. It tends to make
remedy turn on the over-all institutional context rather than the impact of the
discrimination in any single case. In the field of charitable trusts this trait is
particularly pronounced. Were the Ford Foundation to disperse its millions
on a discriminatory basis, society would find the result intolerable. On the
other hand, a trust to educate poor children of a minority race seems useful
114. "Legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in
the law but that are elusive to the grasp." The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922).
An analogous situation occurs when the executor of an estate is presented with a claim
on which the statute of limitations has run. Most recent cases and statutes tend to prohibit
waiver of a good defense by a fiduciary. See Elliott v. First Nat'l Bank, 248 Ala. 360, 27
So2d 623 (1946) ; In re Estate of Smith, 240 Iowa 499, 36 N.W.2d 815 (1949) ; Ellis v.
Cauhaupe, 71 Wyo. 475, 260 P.2d 309 (1953). If an executor is not allowed to fulfill the
moral duty of paying the just debts of the testator when a defense exists, he should not be
allowed to fulfill the moral duty (if any) of carrying out the testator's wishes where they
are contrary to public policy and a valid defense, such as the Fourteenth Amendment,
may be raised.
115. See Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 536, 87 N.E.2d 541, 551
(1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
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and worthy of community approval. Yet they are of the same stuff, and when
the question is limited to the presence or absence of state action, they must
seemingly stand or fall together.
It is unlikely that a federal court, once convinced of the presence of state
participation, would refuse to invalidate a charitable trust on the ground that
it was not of sufficient social significance to justify federal intervention. Modern
philanthropy has assumed the characteristics and dimensions of government.",
Its wealth, in trusts and related forms, can only be measured in the tens of
billions of dollars. And each year a figure approaching four billion more is
added.117 Wealth in such magnitude itself demands the highest degree of social
responsibility.118 The obligations of philanthropy are, however, best described
in terms of the similarity of purpose to which both government and philanthropy
are dedicated, even though their relative contributions vary. At one time, phil-
anthropy was relied upon to take care of the indigent and the aged. Today
government is recognized as better equipped to perform these services. But in
the fields of health, education and research, the two continue to function side by
side, while in religion and the arts, philanthropy remains in substantial measure
supreme.119 Both, in ways dictated 'by their particular capacities, seek a common
goal-the improvement of mankind. Government is subject to the prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It would 'be incongruous if philanthropy, while
operating with the 'helping hand of government and performing the same
essential functions, was to be held to a lesser standard.
Even with the elements of state action thus assembled, doubts as to the ultimate
result persist. When confronted with such facts, state law withholds a remedy,
not because it condones the discrimination, but because it fears the consequences
of the remedy. Policy considerations favor disposition of property in ways of
the owner's choosing. The Supreme Court in Girard did not allow such policy
to excuse governmental participation in a discriminatory scheme, despite the
116. Herein lies an independent basis for holding charitable organizations and trusts
to the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment is applicable
to private organizations exercising powers similar to those of the states. Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953) (political party primaries) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
(company-owned town) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (political party) ; Ross v.
Ebert, 82 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Wis. 1957) (dissenting opinion) (labor union). See Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 208 (1944) (concurring opinion) (same); Note,
61 HARv. L. REv. 344 (1948). But see Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality,
20 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 426, 432-33 (1953) (stating necessity of maintaining a free philan-
thropy to offset governmental monopoly and control of welfare and cultural activities).
For an interesting discussion of the relationship between charitable organizations and
government, see Connecticut College for Women v. Calvert, 87 Conn. 421, 435-36, 88 Atl.
633, 638 (1913) (because college could maintain racially discriminatory admissions policy,
it was not vested with the government power of eminent domain).
117. ANDREWS, PHILANTHROPIc GIVING 74 (1950).
118. See, generally, Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and
the Law, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 155 (1957).
119. ANDREvs, PHILANTHoRPic GIVING 43-49, 172-212 (1950); RICH & DEARDoRFF,
AMEuCAN FOUNDATIONS AND THEIR FIELDs (1948).
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Board's argument attributing the discrimination to Girard. But in future cases
where the identity of the trustee is not in issue, the policy may require a more
specific answer.
Protection of one person's liberty results in the curtailment of another's free-
dom of action. Thus the process of adjusting individual liberties requires a
continuous assessment of priorities between the rights preserved and the rights
removed.120 In so far as the Fourteenth Amendment seeks out purposeful,
invidious discrimination, it would appear to command priority over the testator's
general privilege to control the future uses of his property. For testamentary
disposition is not a natural right but a privilege granted by society. And while
a living person may use his property to indulge his discriminatory purposes, he
should not be allowed to force the state to effectuate post-death public purposes
undermining the standards of society. As Justice Black once said of the rights
of property: "The more an owner . . .opens up his property for use by the
public in general the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory
and constitutional rights of those who use it.'
2 1
State law has always recognized, particularly when a charitable object is
involved, the relative nature of the privilege of owner control.122 Because the
elements in the definition of charity are continuously subject to change, the
hand of the law is frequently stayed for fear that more rigid control will destroy
the good with the bad. Initially, it would appear that the Fourteenth Amendment
might run aground on this same all-or-nothing argument. If its application is
to depend on the factor of state action alone, all classifications-sex, age, geo-
graphical location and above all religion-become suspect, and the basic founda-
tions of the charitable trust are, For allpractical purposes, eliminated. Confronted
by the specter of catastrophe, a court might well become timorous, retreat be-
hind the private discrimination and deny the presence of state action altogether.
Such a result would be too hasty. Wholesale destruction of the charitable trust
is not the inevitable consequence. At least three grounds might be suggested
whereby certain types of classification could be upheld.
First, a religious trust is sufficiently protected by the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom to worship without governmental interference. 123 During
120. HALE, FREEDOm THROUGH LAw 31-82 (1952); Hamilton & Braden, The Special
Competence of the Supreme Court, 50 YALE L.J. 1319, 1349-57 (1941) ; Note, 96 U. PA. L.
REv. 402 (1948).
121. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
122. While granting charitable trusts extensive privileges and immunities, the law
sometimes subjects them to restrictions which are not imposed on any other type of
transfer. Testamentary gifts to charity are limited in several states in the following ways:
N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 17 (amount) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7 (Purdon Supp. 1956)
(time) ; CAL. PROD. CODE ANN. § 41 (Deering Supp. 1955) (both). The amount of land
which may be held a charitable corporation is sometimes limited. 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRusTEEs § 327 (1935); SIBIES, PU3LIC POLICY AND THE DE D HAN 110-14 (1955).
Judicial control of charitable gifts has always been conceded. See, e.g., Curtis, A Better
Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv. 407, 429 (1950).
123. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. Every will represents an exercise of freedom of speech
and as such is entitled to protection up to the point that it requires unlawful conduct of
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the debates on that amendment, apprehension was expressed that the separation
of church and state doctrine might jeopardize gifts for religious purposes.
This fear was dispelled by the authors' conviction that such a result was not to
be tolerated.124 In like manner, the equal protection clause should be kept
secondary and relative. Religious institutions are maintained almost exclusively
by donations and trusts. Any rule which reduced this source of revenue
would significantly curtail the opportunity to worship, a right made fundamental
by the First Amendment. The scope of this protective haven may not always
prove easy to define. Trusts for religious purposes and institutions such as
churches and church-sponsored schools, hospitals and cemeteries would probably
be included. 1 2 5 Less certain are trusts where the religious classification bears
no relationship to the purpose-for example, a trust for the poor of the Protes-
tant faith or for education of Jewish boys in non-sectarian schools. A balance
is required, but one that is not new to the law. The existing process for adjusting
the competing claims of the separation and religious liberty doctrines of the
First Amendment provides a useful parallel.
126
Second, the Fourteenth Amendment permits a certain degree of discrimina-
tion through "rational" classification. 12 7 Presumably a city or state may estab-
lish a school restricted to persons of a particular sex or age if such a classifica-
tion is justifiable in terms of some legitimate objective. No less privilege should
be extended to a property owner. The scope of this exception cannot be set by
precise formulae. Up to the point where his selection approaches the basic civil
others. Situations could arise in which the rights of expression and thought take priority
over the inhibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus it might be argued that a trust
which calls for research and education in the justifications for preserving segregation
should be permitted as a legitimate exercise of the democratic process of criticizing ex-
isting laws. See Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 101-03 (1948) (dissenting opinion) (con-
spiracy to counsel and advise polygamy).
124. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
125. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parochial schools have con-
stitutional right to exist) ; Miller, Racial Discrimination and Private Schools, 41 MINN.
L. REv. 145, 150-51 (1957) ; Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHi.
L. REV. 426, 439 (1953) ; see also, Rueben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). In
Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70 (1955), the Court refused
to upset an Iowa ruling permitting discrimination in cemetery contracts. Since the dis-
crimination was racial, the Court did not discuss freedom of religion. See note 130 infra.
A distinction between sectarian hospitals and orphanages, and those sponsored by rc-
ligious groups but open to the public generally, seems relevant. See Bradfield v. Roberts,
175 U.S. 291 (1899); Kentucky Bldg. Comm'n v. Effron, 310 Ky. 355, 220 S.W.2d 836
(1949) ; State ex rel. Nevada Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882).
126. Katz, supra note 125.
127. Goeseart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (only wife or daughter of tavern owners
eligible for barmaid licenses); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S.
552 (1947) (presently licensed river pilots required to certify license applicants although
in practice only relatives of present pilots were certified) ; Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach,
274 U.S. 392 (1927) (restriction of poolroom licenses to citizens). But see Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885).
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rights, a testator could employ many of the traditional grounds for selecting
beneficiaries.
Finally, the cases indicate that not all racial discrimination is proscribed, by
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Snowden v. Hughes, the Supreme Court ruled
that discriminatory administration of a non-discriminatory statute-certifica-
tion of primary election returns-would amount to a violation of the equal
protection clause only if the discrimination were "intentional or purposeful." 128
In that context, purposeful discrimination would necessarily have been mali-
cious.' 2 In the charitable trust, on the other hand, discriminatory selection of
beneficiaries, though intentional, need not be so designed. For example, the settlor
who purposely limits his bounty to aid for a minority group may not be motivated
by malice. Yet the Snowden approach could be utilized in judging charitable
trusts. By reading "malicious" into "purposeful or intentional," a construction
necessitated by the change in context, the courts could develop gradations of
racial discrimination in charitable trusts and thus meet the demands of the
problem without risking destruction of the institution. But can a trust favoring
a minority race be distinguished from one limited to the white majority? A nega-
tive answer seems practically inescapable. With a considerable section of the
population already in open revolt against its authority, the Supreme Court
cannot approve a rule which makes equality of treatment a one-way street.
Furthermore, a distinction based on the good or bad intent of a person who may
have been dead for many years, as the general law of charitable trusts has long
since recognized, is too unreliable to provide a basis for judging propriety of
an individual trust.
Other gradation possibilities are suggested in the occasional remarks of indi-
vidual justices. For example, Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented in Rice v.
Sioux City Ajeniorial Park Cemetery, Inc. to the effect that even if state action
were assumed, the difficult question whether the particular discrimination were
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment would remain.130 This statement recog-
nizes a necessary question beyond the primary inquiry into governmental par-
ticipation. Equality is a goal never finally attainable, nor even susceptible of
complete definition. Governmental action has a varying effect on persons de-
128. 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944) (direct federal action for damages in which petitioner
conceded that discrimination was not based on race).
129. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting on a procedural ground, expressed the implicit
content of "intentional or purposeful": "I believe, as the opinion of the Court indicates, that
a denial of equal protection of the laws requires an invidious, purposeful discrimination."
Id. at 18.
130. "Only if a State deprives any person or denies him enforcement of a right guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment can its protection be invoked. Such a claim involves
the threshold problem whether, in the circumstances of this case, what Iowa, through its
courts, did amounted to 'state action.' This is a complicated problem which for long has
divided opinion in this Court.... Were this hurdle cleared, the ultimate substantive question,
whether in the circumstances of this case the action complained of was condemned by the
Fourteenth Amendment, would in turn present no easy constitutional problem." 349 U.S.
70, 72 (1955).
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pending on their situations and identity. Yet if this constituted inequality of
treatment before the law, practical paralysis of governmental operation would
result. In the process of charting a course between the permissible and the
prohibited, certain racial distinctions must be accepted. Thus state courts
deciding questions of adoption and custody may consider racial and religious
compatibility as relevant in matching children to parents.131 And the federal
census may classify the population in its racial components. Seemingly at work
in these situations, only two of a number of possible examples, is a value judg-
ment that the harm is either insignificant or offset by some counterbalancing
benefit. Accordingly, discrimination might be measured by its effect on the
community. Is it incidental and harmless or does it touch the essentials of
democracy? Thus a distinction could be drawn between the segregated insti-
tution and the racially restricted scholarship fund. The first is a proper target
since it effects an actual separation of the races, while the second would be
permissible so long as the education itself were available on a non-segregated
basis.
CONCLUSION
The case for making all charitable trusts subject to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment need not stand or fall on the amendment's capacity to reach only a few
of the more extreme instances of discrimination. But, so long as the law
retains its present inflexibility, the price of a solution may be too high. It has
beeA-said that a charitable trust contains "an anomalous dichotomy, [a] mani-
festation of quasi-socialism on the one hand, and of the most extreme incidents
of a regime of private property on the other."' 3 2 These two elements are of
the fabric of the institution. Yet the state action concept cannot treat them
as equals; it must divide and rate them, making one supreme and the other
subordinate. Thus the law is confronted with a choice between two extremes,
either one of which creates as many problems as it solves. If a court finds
the state's participation in a charitable trust the controlling factor, the owner's
power to dispose and the trust's power to use property will be within the
purview of limitations heretofore considered inapplicable. Yet society's stake
in both of these freedoms militates in favor of their continuance without
restriction. And considerations of federalism may point to the retention of the
131. To the effect that the factors of race and religion may be considered but should
not be exclusively decisive, see In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir.
1955) (denial of adoption not to rest on distinction between "social status" of whites and
Negroes) ; Fountaine v. Fountaine, 9 Ill. App. 2d 482, 133 N.E.2d 532 (1956) (custody
not to be determined on sole ground of children's racial physical characteristics) ; Petition
of Gally, 329 Mass. 143, 148, 107 N.E.2d 21, 25 (1952) (identity of religion not the "sole
or necessarily the principal consideration"). See statutes collected in Comment, Moppets
on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YALE L.J. 715, 722 n.36
(1950) (these statutory restrictions raise a "serious constitutional question under the 'equal
protection' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
132. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 111 (1955).
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limited federal intervention resulting from a narrow definition of state action.13
If, on the other hand, the owner's prerogatives are made paramount, society
will be compelled to accept and support a trust which frustrates its public policy.
It is too early to determine the influence that the Girard trust will have on
the ultimate result. Wrhile the Court's holding is limited to direct participation
of a governmental trustee, the underlying premise may well presage more
comprehensive coverage. The Pennsylvania courts saw the necessity of attribut-
ing the discrimination to the testator. By rejecting this line of argument without
comment, the Supreme Court substantially weakened, if not removed, the prin-
cipal defense by which the charitable trust in general might escape constitu-
tional prohibitions. If the testator does not control the operation of his trust,
the law must. And should the Girard trust return to the Supreme Court with
a new trustee, the already perplexing issues of the charitable trust will be
compounded by the fact that the form of the particular trust wvas designed to
evade an earlier decision. Confronted by such situations in the past, the Court
has always stood firm against the discrimination. With the vitality of the de-
segregation cases at stake, it could hardly do less in this event.
In deciding Girard, the Court has opened new vistas in the constitutional
field of discrimination. The case demonstrates the legal difficulties which result
from testing all the variables involved in race conflict by the single doctrine of
state action. Future controversies will demand a new ordering of doctrine and
a clarification of the substantive evils which the Fourteenth Amendment is
designed to prohibit. In terms of practical impact, the case reveals that the
opportunities for equality are not confined to the fields of public education
and transportation but move broadly into cognate areas exemplified by private
charities and educational establishments. The possibilities so engendered for
new attacks on an old problem- seem literally boundless.
133. The authority to determine the propriety of charitable trusts has traditionally
belonged to the states. However, their jurisdiction is not exclusive since the federal
courts in regulating federal tax exemptions may independently withhold one of the privileges
which usually accompanies a charitable designation. But federal tax decisions do not affect
the basic enforceability of the trust. See PAUl., FEDMAL ES'ATE AND GIrv TAXATIO
§§ 12.05-.17 (1942). The Court's understandable reluctance to encroach upon the areas
of law heretofore reserved to the states is a strong deterrent to any expansion of the state
action concept beyond its present limits. But sce Orleans Parish School Board
v. Bush, 242 F2d 156, 166 (5th Cir. 1957) : "However undesirable it may be for courts
to invoke Federal power to stay action under state authority, it was precisely to require
such interposition that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted by the people of the United
States. Its adoption implies that there are matters of fundamental justice that the citizens
of the United States consider so essentially an ingredient of human rights as to require
a restraint on action on behalf of any state that appears to ignore them."
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